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Introduction
In an interbank market, banks trade credits at the interbank rate to adjust their
cash holdings. The interbank credit conditions influence the credit conditions for
households and firms. Therefore, because a central bank holds the instruments to
steer the interbank rate, it is able to impact the economic development. If the cen-
tral bank wants to foster economic growth, it lowers the interbank rate. To this end,
the central bank uses reverse open market operations to offer credit to interbank
borrowers.
There are two types of reverse open market operations, fixed and variable rate ten-
ders. In a fixed rate tender, the central bank announces the interest rate for central
bank credits in advance and banks bid the amount of credits they wish to get from
the central bank. In a variable rate tender, banks bid both the interest rate they
are willing to pay and the amount of central bank credits they wish to transact.
Central banks do not necessarily stick to one of the two tender types. For example,
from 1999 to June 2000, the European Central Bank (ECB) conducted its reverse
open market operations as fixed rate tenders. Because of low allotment ratios, the
ECB started to use variable rate tenders and sticked to this procedure from June
2000 to October 2008. In October 2008, the ECB switched back to the fixed rate
tender. The fact that both types of reverse open market operations are actually in
use naturally raises the following question. How do fixed and variable rate tenders
differ in their effect on the interbank market?
From a micro-theoretic point of view, the answer to this question builds on compar-
ative statics analysis, i.e., the comparison of the market outcome before and after
exogenous parameter changes. Comparative statics results in turn are easier to in-
terpret if the market outcome is unique. This dissertation is a collection of three
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essays addressing these aspects of equilibrium analysis in markets with asymmetric
information. The first essay examines the uniqueness of the market-clearing equi-
librium and its refinements. The second essay explores how equilibrium price, trade
volume, and excess supply in the unique equilibrium react to exogenous parameter
changes. The third essay picks up the motivating example. It answers the question
whether and how a fixed rate tender differs from a variable rate tender in its effect
on the interbank market.
Chapter 1 delivers conditions for the uniqueness of the market-clearing equilibrium
and its possible refinements in markets with asymmetric information on the good’s
quality. In these markets, sellers observe the quality of their good, whereas buyers
only observe the average quality of goods in the market, but not the individual
quality of a good.
The chapter is divided into three parts, each of them discussing a specific equilibrium
concept. The first part of the analysis considers the market-clearing equilibrium.
Multiple market-clearing equilibria may arise if not only supply, but also demand is
increasing in price. This in turn requires that an increase in price leads to a strong
inflow of sellers with high-quality goods. As a result, buyers find it more attractive
to buy at higher than at lower prices. It is shown that a non-increasing elasticity
of supply is sufficient for demand to be weakly decreasing in price and hence, the
market-clearing equilibrium to be unique. Thus, it suffices that the inflow of sellers
with high-quality goods decreases with price. Most standard quality distributions
satisfy this requirement.
The second part of the analysis studies a refinement of the market-clearing equi-
librium. This refinement accounts for the possibility that the market-clearing price
does not necessarily maximize individual utility. Hence, instead of trading at the
market-clearing price, buyers and sellers may want to renegotiate the trading price
after being matched. However, if the elasticity of supply is not only non-increasing
but also sufficiently low, agents always unilaterally offer to trade at the unique
market-clearing price.
The third part of the analysis addresses the possibility of non-clearing equilibria. It
studies the conditions under which each type of agent unilaterally offers to trade
at a unique price, but this price is not the market-clearing price. Instead, there
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is either excess demand or excess supply. The analysis shows that there are only
equilibria with excess supply. For such an equilibrium to be unique, it suffices to
impose a constant elasticity of supply.
The main result of Chapter 1 is that the uniqueness of equilibrium in markets with
asymmetric information can be achieved by imposing restrictions on the elasticity
of supply.
Chapter 2 builds on the equilibrium characterization in Chapter 1 and presents
comparative statics analysis with respect to changes in the type distributions of
market participants. In particular, it provides sufficient conditions for monotone
comparative statics of equilibrium price, trade volume, and excess supply in mar-
kets with asymmetric information. If there is asymmetric information on quality,
the buyers’ demand not only depends on the price, but also on the average quality
in the market. Thus, exogenous changes in the distribution of quality not only affect
supply, they also affect demand.
The chapter contains three parts. The first part of Chapter 2 examines exogenous
changes in the mix of market participants which unambiguously decrease equilib-
rium trade volume. It builds on the observation that for equilibrium trade volume to
decrease, it suffices that both demand and supply react negatively to the exogenous
changes. Thus, the exogenous changes have to be such that the quality distribution
first-order stochastically dominates the initial one, and the elasticity of supply and
the aggregate willingness to buy decrease.
The second part of Chapter 2 studies comparative statics of the equilibrium price.
Monotone predictions of prices require a different set of conditions on the exogenous
changes than predictions of trade volume. For the equilibrium price to increase,
it suffices that the demand reaction to exogenous changes is positive, whereas the
supply reaction is negative. Thus, for a higher equilibrium price, the quality dis-
tribution has to change such that it first-order stochastically dominates the initial
one, and the elasticity of supply and the aggregate willingness to buy are required
to increase.
The last part of Chapter 2 presents sufficient conditions for an unambiguous increase
in equilibrium excess supply. Since excess supply denotes the difference between
equilibrium supply and equilibrium demand, an increase in equilibrium supply and
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a decrease in equilibrium demand suffice to raise equilibrium excess supply. The
conditions for unambiguous predictions of excess supply relate to the conditions for
trade volume. In particular, higher excess supply requires that both the elasticity
of supply and the aggregate willingness to buy decrease. However, the quality dis-
tribution has to change such that it is first-order stochastically dominated by the
initial one.
The main result of Chapter 2 is that for unambiguous predictions of the market out-
come, exogenous changes in the type distributions of market participants need to
fulfill well-defined conditions. There are different sets of conditions for equilibrium
price, trade volume, and excess supply.
Chapter 3 builds on the methods and results in Chapter 1 and 2. In particular,
Chapter 3 studies fixed and variable rate tenders and how the interbank market
reacts to these tenders. It is assumed that in the interbank market, lenders cannot
observe the borrowers’ individual default probabilities. Thus, all credits are settled
at the same interest rate. This raises the problem of adverse selection. Because bor-
rowers with a high probability of default have a high willingness to pay, an interest
rate only attracts borrowers with relatively high default probabilities. As a result,
lenders may not be willing to lend at lower rates and the interbank rate may be
high. This in turn may lead to a central bank intervention.
Chapter 3 is divided into two parts. The first part shows that both the fixed and the
variable rate tender decrease the unique market-clearing interbank rate by lowering
demand for interbank credits. The differences between the two tenders are that the
variable rate tender may lower the interbank market by more than the fixed rate
tender, whereas the fixed rate tender allows the central bank to choose from a set
of possible interbank rates.
The second part of the analysis reveals that by lowering the interbank rate, both the
fixed and the variable rate tender increase social welfare, i.e., the sum of aggregate
rents of borrowers, lenders, and the central bank. However, the tenders differ insofar
as the fixed rate tender increases the aggregate welfare of borrowers and lenders by
more than the variable rate tender. In contrast, the central bank’s rent is higher
with the variable rate tender than with the fixed rate tender.
The main result of Chapter 3 is that with asymmetric information on default prob-
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abilities, fixed and variable rate tenders differ in their effect on the interbank rate
and welfare.
The three essays shed light on equilibrium analysis and central bank interventions
in markets with asymmetric information. The first two essays specify conditions
for the uniqueness of equilibrium and unambiguous comparative statics results for
equilibrium price, trade volume, and excess supply. These results and the underly-
ing methods are useful to answer a wide range of economic questions. In particular,
they allow discussing the motivating example. In the third essay it is shown that,
given asymmetric information on default probabilities, fixed and variable rate ten-
ders differ in their effect on the interbank market. The drop in the interbank rate
and the increase in the central bank’s rent are smaller, whereas the increase in ag-
gregate welfare of borrowers and lenders is larger with a fixed than with a variable
rate tender.
Chapter 1
Unique Market-Clearing
Equilibrium in Markets for
“Lemons”
joint with Christian Ewerhart
1 Introduction
In a market where the quality of the good differs across sellers, buyers may not be
able to observe the individual quality of the good. In contrast to the sellers which
are fully informed about the quality of their endowment, buyers may only observe
the average quality of goods in the market. Because buyers cannot distinguish goods
of different quality, all goods sell at the same price. Then, the buyer’s decision to
buy at this price depends on the average quality of goods offered for sale and her
individual preference for quality. In contrast, the seller’s decision whether to sell
at this price depends on her reservation price, which is assumed to be increasing in
quality. This, however, may lead to adverse selection, the so-called “lemons” prob-
lem. More precisely, a price only attracts “lemons”, i.e., sellers with relatively low
reservation prices and accordingly, relatively low quality. The standard example is
the market for used cars. While sellers have enough time and knowledge to judge
the quality of a used car, buyers are restricted in their ability to learn the quality
of this car before buying it.
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If buyers and sellers in this market are price-takers, the equilibrium concept of
market-clearing seems suitable to describe the market outcome. However, in mar-
kets with asymmetric information, the market-clearing equilibrium features some
remarkable characteristics. First, there may be no market-clearing equilibrium at
all. Akerlof (1970) presents an example where average quality at each price is so
low that buyers never find it optimal to buy goods. Second, there may be more
than one market-clearing price and some of them may not be stable equilibria (cf.
Wilson, 1979). This may occur if an increase in price leads to a strong increase in
average quality such that demand for goods is actually increasing in price. If buyers
and sellers had the choice, they would then prefer the higher over the lower market-
clearing price. Third, the market-clearing price at which goods are traded does not
necessarily maximize all sellers’ and buyers’ utilities. While sellers generally prefer
the highest possible price, the most favorable price may differ among buyers if they
differ in quality preferences. Hence, if buyers or sellers had some price-setting power,
trading prices may differ from the market-clearing price. These characteristics make
the study of markets with asymmetric information more difficult than markets with
symmetric information.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the specific characteristics of the market-
clearing equilibrium and present conditions for a simple equilibrium analysis in
markets with asymmetric information. In particular, we discuss the market-clearing
concept and its possible refinements and study equilibrium uniqueness. Thereby, we
use the standard set-up as introduced by Akerlof (1970) and Wilson (1980). We show
that a non-increasing elasticity of supply is sufficient for a unique market-clearing
equilibrium. The condition on the elasticity of supply can be reformulated as the
requirement that the distribution of quality q has to be log-concave in log q. We
then show that many quality distributions satisfy this requirement. The uniqueness
condition also carries over to a set-up where sellers offering the same quality may
have different reservation prices.
In our standard set-up, buyers and sellers are randomly matched to trade at the
market-clearing price. However, it may be optimal for the pair to renegotiate the
trading price after being matched to maximize individual utility. We therefore intro-
duce an adjusted set-up which allows a single seller or a single buyer to unilaterally
announce a trading price. In this adjusted set-up, the equilibrium is defined as a
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refined market-clearing equilibrium where neither buyers nor sellers have an incen-
tive to unilaterally announce a price different from the market-clearing price. We
show that for the unique market-clearing equilibrium to be a refined market-clearing
equilibrium, the elasticity of supply not only has to be non-increasing in price, it also
has to be sufficiently low at high prices. We extend our analysis by incorporating
the possibility that goods are not necessarily traded at a market-clearing price. We
define a refined equilibrium as some price which implies either excess demand or ex-
cess supply and neither buyers nor sellers have an incentive to unilaterally announce
another price. We find that there is no refined equilibrium with excess demand,
but there may exist a refined equilibrium with excess supply. We show that for the
existence and uniqueness of the refined equilibrium with excess supply, it suffices to
impose a constant elasticity of supply.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
In Section 3, we outline the model. In Section 4, we derive sufficient conditions
for a unique market-clearing equilibrium. Section 5 shows that many distributions
feature a unique market-clearing equilibrium. Section 6 presents sufficient condi-
tions for a unique refined market-clearing equilibrium. We study the uniqueness of
a refined equilibrium in Section 7. In Section 8, we extend the model by introducing
multidimensional seller types. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
Most closely related is the contribution of Wilson (1980). He uses the standard
set-up to derive a condition for multiple market-clearing equilibria. This condition
requires the slope of average quality as a function of price to be large enough. The
difference here is that our condition on the elasticity of supply can be reformulated
as a restriction on the primitive. Moreover, Wilson (1980) also studies the unique-
ness of more refined market-clearing concepts where either buyers or sellers have
price-setting power. That is, every buyer simultaneously announces a price and sell-
ers search for the most favorable price and vice versa. Besides allowing all buyers or
sellers to make simultaneous announcements, Wilson’s (1980) refined concepts dif-
1Some of the results in this paper have appeared in a preliminary form in our IEW Working
Paper No. 455.
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fer from ours insofar as they require strong assumptions on expectations of market
participants on the price-setting behavior of others.
Rewriting Wilson’s (1980) condition for a unique market-clearing equilibrium, Rose
(1993) finds that an elasticity of average quality smaller than one is sufficient for
uniqueness. Considering this condition as analytically intractable, he shows numer-
ically that many standard distributions fulfill it. Again, our uniqueness condition
is more informative because it restricts the primitive. Moreover, reformulating our
uniqueness condition as described above allows to reproduce and extend Rose’s nu-
merical results using simple calculus.
Several other papers have delivered conditions for a unique market-clearing equilib-
rium in markets with asymmetric information. However, the set-ups used in these
studies differ from ours and therefore, from the standard set-up. In contrast to
our set-up where there is a continuum of buyer types with individual preference for
quality, Bagnoli and Bergstro¨m (2005) study an example with a single buyer type.2
They show that in their set-up, there is a unique market-clearing equilibrium if the
cumulative distribution function of quality is log-concave in quality.3 Bigelow (1990)
studies the unique market-clearing equilibrium in a market with a single buyer and a
single seller and two possible realizations of quality. He finds a uniqueness condition
which restricts the allowable convexity of the quality distribution.
Our study also refers to the vast literature on rationing, i.e., on excess demand or
supply, especially in the context of credit markets. In these markets, the uniqueness
of equilibrium hinges on the assumption that the lender’s return on a loan as a func-
tion of the interest rate has a unique maximum. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue
that this return function has an interior maximum because the adverse selection
effect dominates the direct effect of an increase in the interest rate at high rates.
However, Arnold and Riley (2009) show that there is no such interior maximum.
Instead, the return on a loan is maximized at a very high interest rate where only
the most risky borrowers are left in the market and there are no infra-marginal bor-
rowers which extract informational rents. The return maximization argument also
applies to efficiency wages in markets with asymmetric information on individual
2Their study was first published in 1989.
3Note that our restriction on the quality distribution, i.e., ∂ logF (q)/∂ log q, can be rewritten
as q · (∂ logF (q)/∂q).
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productivity of employees.4 A comprehensive analysis of the labor market’s unique
equilibrium with rationing can be found in Stiglitz (1976), for example.
With the literature on monopolistic power, search, and matching, this paper shares
the property that one single agent may have some price-setting power. Examples of
markets with a single price-setting seller are given by Adriani and Deidda (2009),
Bester and Ritzberger (2001), and Ellingsen (1997). In search and matching models,
trading partners meet pairwise either by random matching or by searching at some
cost. Price is bilaterally negotiated or determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers (see,
e.g., Inderst and Mu¨ller, 2002, Bester, 1988, Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright, 2010,
Ponsat´ı and Sa´kovics, 2008, and Blouin, 2003).
3 Set-up
In this section, we introduce the set-up and define the market-clearing and the
refined market-clearing equilibrium.
3.1 Price-taking buyers and sellers
There is a market for an indivisible good. Assume for the moment that in this
market, both sellers and buyers are price-takers. We will later relax the price-taking
assumption.
In this market, there is a continuum of sellers, whose population size is normalized
to one. Each seller possesses one unit of the good and wants to sell it in the market.
Endowments across sellers differ in quality q, where q ∈ [q0, q1] with q0 < q1. The
quality of endowments is distributed according to some strictly positive density f on
[q0, q1]. We assume that q not only describes the quality of the seller’s endowment,
but also perfectly describes the seller’s reservation price. Hence, a seller is willing to
sell her endowment if the offered price p is weakly higher than quality q. It follows
that if there is a single market price p, supply at this price is given by S(p) = F (p),
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of q.
There is also a continuum of buyers. Again, we normalize the size of the buyer
population to one. Buyers have no endowment and want to buy one unit of the
4See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) for an overview of the early literature.
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good. In contrast to sellers, buyers cannot observe the individual quality of a unit.
However, they are able to infer average quality of units on offer from price p. It
is assumed that buyers differ in their preference for quality, i.e., each buyer has an
individual preference type t ∈ [t0, t1] with t0 < t1 and t1 > 1. Preference types
are distributed according to some density h on [t0, t1]. Note that the individual
preference type is private information. A buyer is willing to buy a good if tq¯(p) ≥ p,
where q¯(p) = E[q | q ≤ p] is the average quality of units on offer. Let q¯(p) = q0 at
price p = q0. Consequently, if p is the single market price, demand at this price is
given by D(p) = 1−H(p/q¯(p)), where H(t) is the fraction of buyers with preference
type ≤ t.
Having introduced the market characteristics as well as demand and supply, we now
turn to the market equilibrium. Taking into account that both sellers and buyers
are price-takers, we define a market-clearing equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1. A market-clearing equilibrium is a price p∗ for which S(p∗) = D(p∗),
i.e.,
F (p∗) = 1−H(p∗/q¯(p∗)). (1)
Intuitively, price-taking agents decide at which prices they are willing to buy or sell,
respectively. Given the resulting demand and supply functions, the market-clearing
price p∗ can be determined. Then, unless there is no central clearing institution
which carries out all trades, buyers willing to buy at this price are randomly matched
with sellers willing to sell at p∗ and units are traded bilaterally at price p∗.
3.2 A single agent with price-setting power
Even though any individual price-setting attempts are excluded in Definition 1,
bilateral matching leaves room for buyers and sellers to take a more active role in
the price-setting mechanism. In particular, buyers and sellers may find it optimal
to renegotiate the trading price as soon as they are matched. To be able to discuss
price renegotiations and the conditions under which the result of these renegotiations
is p∗, we adjust the set-up introduced in Section 3.1 and refine the definition of
equilibrium.
Suppose that a single buyer is given some price-setting power. In this case, the
market works as follows.
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Definition 2 (Buyer announcement). Assume that there is a market-clearing
price p∗ for which D(p∗) = S(p∗). Before buyers are matched with sellers and any
trade takes place, one single buyer who is willing to buy at p∗, i.e., a buyer with
t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1], is chosen at random. This buyer has the possibility to announce
the price at which she prefers to buy. The announced price may differ from the
market-clearing price p∗. However, if the buyer is indifferent between the market-
clearing price p∗ and any other price p, the buyer sticks to p∗. We assume that all
sellers can costlessly compare the announced price p with the market-clearing price
p∗. Moreover, we assume that all sellers who prefer p over p∗ are equally likely to
sell their good at p. Those sellers which cannot sell at the announced price may sell
their endowment at p∗.
Suppose now that instead of a single buyer a single seller is given some price-setting
power. In this case, the market works as follows.
Definition 3 (Seller announcement). Assume that there is a market-clearing
price p∗ for which S(p∗) = D(p∗). Before sellers and buyers are matched and goods
are traded, a single seller willing to sell at p∗, i.e., a seller with q ≤ p∗, is randomly
chosen. This seller has the possibility to announce the price at which she prefers to
sell. The announced price may differ from p∗. However, if the seller is indifferent
between p∗ and any other price, she will announce p∗. We assume that all buyers can
costlessly compare the announced price p with the market-clearing price p∗. More-
over, we assume that buyers expect the unit quality of the single seller announcing
p to be q¯(p) for p ≤ p∗ and q¯(p∗) for p > p∗. All buyers who prefer p over p∗ are
equally likely to buy the good at p. Those buyers who cannot buy at p may buy a
good at p∗.
If all buyers with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1] and all sellers with q ≤ p∗ unilaterally announce
the market-clearing price p∗, this price is robust to any possible buyer and seller an-
nouncement. Lemma 1 presents the condition for robustness of the market-clearing
price.
Lemma 1. The market-clearing price p∗ is robust to any unilateral announcement
of buyers with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1] and sellers with q ≤ p∗ if
p∗ = arg max
p
u(p; p∗, t), (2)
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where
u(p; p∗, t) =
0 for p < p∗tq¯(p)− p for p ≥ p∗ (3)
for t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1].
Proof. Assume the market-clearing price to be p∗ and assume that there is a buyer
announcement as defined in Definition 2. The buyer with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1] may
consider to unilaterally announce p < p∗. However, no seller is willing to offer her
good at p because all sellers willing to sell at p∗ are able to sell at this price and
sellers always prefer higher over lower prices. Hence, because the buyer’s utility is
zero at p and non-negative at p∗, she rather sticks to p∗ than announcing a price
p < p∗. However, the buyer may also consider to announce p > p∗. At such a price,
all sellers with q ≤ p also want to sell at p. The buyer’s utility at p is therefore given
by tq¯(p) − p. Thus, the buyer’s utility from unilateral announcement p is given by
u(p; p∗, t) as defined in Lemma 1. If p∗ maximizes u(p; p∗, t) for t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1],
every buyer with such a type will unilaterally announce p∗ such that p∗ is robust to
any buyer announcement.
Consider now the case where instead of a buyer announcement there is a seller
announcement as defined in Definition 3. The seller with q ≤ p∗ has no incentive
to announce a price p < p∗ because she has always the possibility to sell her good
at the market-clearing price p∗. However, the seller may consider to unilaterally
announce a price p > p∗. Such an announcement generates positive utility with
p − q > p∗ − q, if there are some buyers willing to trade at price p. If a seller
announces p, a buyer’s utility from buying at p > p∗ is given by tq¯(p∗) − p for
t ∈ [t0, t1]. Because tq¯(p∗) − p < tq¯(p∗) − p∗ for p > p∗, no buyer is willing to
offer to buy at p > p∗. Hence, the seller’s utility from announcing p > p∗ is zero
such that she will unilaterally announce p∗. As a result, p∗ is robust to any seller
announcement. 
In this adjusted set-up, the equilibrium is called the refined market-clearing equilib-
rium and it is defined as follows.
Definition 4. A refined market-clearing equilibrium is a price p∗r which satisfies the
following two conditions:
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i) S(p∗r) = D(p
∗
r), i.e., F (p
∗
r) = 1−H(p∗r/q¯(p∗r))
ii) p∗r is robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p∗r/q¯(p∗r), t1]
and sellers with q ≤ p∗r.
We now discuss the conditions for a unique market-clearing and refined market-
clearing equilibrium.
4 Unique market-clearing equilibrium
Clearly, a unique market-clearing equilibrium requires supply and demand as func-
tions of price to intersect at most once. Since f > 0, supply S(p) = F (p) is
continuous and strictly increasing on the price interval [q0, q1], while constant and
strictly positive for p > q1, and zero for p ≤ q0. Demand for the indivisible good
depends on the price-quality ratio p/q¯(p). Average quality is not defined for p < q0.
Moreover, it is increasing on the price interval [q0, q1], and constant and positive for
p > q1. Therefore, demand is not defined for prices p < q0 such that it cannot cross
supply at these prices. Moreover, demand is strictly declining for prices p > q1.
At price p = q0, the price-quality ratio equals one. Given that t1 > 1, demand is
positive, whereas supply is zero. Hence, for at most one market-clearing equilibrium
it suffices that demand is weakly declining on the price interval [q0, q1]. This in
turn requires that for prices [q0, q1], the price-quality ratio is weakly increasing in
price. Define the price elasticity of supply as εS = (∂S/∂p) · (p/S). As we will show
below, a weakly declining elasticity of supply is sufficient for a weakly increasing
price-quality ratio. Theorem 1 formalizes these results.
Theorem 1. Assume ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 for prices p ∈ [q0, q1]. Then ∂D/∂p ≤ 0 for
p ≥ q0, and the market-clearing equilibrium is unique.
Proof. For demand D(p) = 1 − H(p/q¯(p)) to be weakly decreasing on the price
interval [q0, q1], it suffices to show that p/q¯(p) weakly increases in p, i.e.,
∂
∂p
p
q¯(p)
= p
(
q¯(p)
p
− ∂q¯(p)
∂p
)
≥ 0 (4)
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for all p ∈ [q0, q1]. Applying Van den Berg (1994), the condition ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0
suffices for d log q¯(p)/d log p ≤ 1 to be satisfied (the details are left to the appendix).
Using the fact that d log p = (1/p)dp, one can rewrite d log q¯(p)/d log p ≤ 1 as
dq¯(p)/dp ≤ q¯(p)/p. This implies that with a non-increasing elasticity of supply, the
bracket in (4) is non-negative and the weak inequality is satisfied. It follows that
under a non-increasing elasticity of supply, demand D(p) is weakly declining on
the interval [q0, q1], and strictly declining or zero for p > q1. Hence, D(p)− S(p) is
strictly decreasing or negative for all p ≥ q0 and there is at most one market-clearing
equilibrium. 
Intuitively, to get a declining demand function, the price-quality ratio p/q¯(p) has to
get worse with price. Consider the marginal buyer type which is indifferent between
buying and dropping out of the market at price p. Since the marginal buyer’s type
is given by t = p/q¯(p), demand is decreasing in price if the price-quality ratio is
increasing. This in turn requires the increase in average quality to decrease with
price. I.e., the inflow of sellers with high quality goods needs to decrease with price.
A weakly decreasing elasticity of supply reflects exactly this requirement.
Figure I illustrates an example for a market with a unique market-clearing equilib-
rium. Thereby, quality q is log-normally distributed on [0, 3.4], whereas t is uniformly
distributed on [1, 2.2].
p
D S
q1
p*=1.2
S,Dq0
S(p*)=0.76 1
Figure I: Example for a unique market-clearing equilibrium
Because the distribution of quality is log-normal, the elasticity of supply is decreas-
ing and the price-quality ratio is increasing for prices p ∈ [q0, q1]. This leads to an
everywhere weakly declining demand and a unique market-clearing equilibrium.
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Wilson (1979) presents an example where in our set-up, the market-clearing equi-
librium is not unique. As the left-hand side of Figure II illustrates, there are three
market-clearing equilibria in his example.
p pSD
S D εS
εS
,
Figure II: Multiplicity of the market-clearing equilibrium in an example due to
Wilson (1979)
We reconstructed Wilson’s example and derived the corresponding elasticity of sup-
ply, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure II. It turns out that for the relevant
prices, ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 is not satisfied. Instead, the elasticity of supply increases at
intermediate price levels (between the two dashed lines). At these prices, there is
a strong inflow of high quality goods sellers such that the price-quality ratio de-
creases. As a result, demand increases at intermediate price levels and there are
multiple market-clearing equilibria. Wilson’s example also illustrates that demand
may continue to increase when the elasticity of supply already begins to decline.
Clearly, this results from the fact that q¯(p) averages over all submarginal qualities.
5 Distributions implying uniqueness
In this section, we show that a wide range of quality distributions imply a unique
market-clearing equilibrium.
To investigate the question which quality distribution features a non-increasing elas-
ticity of supply and implies a unique market-clearing equilibrium, we reformulate
the condition on the elasticity of supply in Theorem 1.
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Theorem 2. Assume that F (q) is log-concave in log q for q ∈ [q0, q1]. Then,
∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 for p ∈ [q0, q1].
Proof. Using ∂p = p · ∂ log p one can write
∂εS(p)
∂p
=
∂
∂p
[
∂ logF
∂ log p
]
=
1
p
[
∂2 logF
∂(log p)2
]
≤ 0. (5)

Since the closed-form representation of the cumulative distribution function may
not always exist (see, for example, Ewerhart, 2011), we rewrite the condition in
Theorem 2 as a condition on the density function.
Theorem 3. Assume that f(q) is continuously differentiable and log-concave in
log q.5 Then, F (q) is log-concave in log q.
Proof. Assume that f(q) is log-concave in log q. Write pi = log q. Then, q =
exp(pi), and log f(q) = log f(exp(pi)) is concave in pi. Write g(pi) = f(exp(pi)) exp(pi).
From log g(pi) = log f(exp(pi)) + pi, it follows that log g(pi) is concave in pi. Hence,
g(pi) is log-concave in pi. By Theorem 1 in Bagnoli and Bergstro¨m (2005), the
indefinite integral G(pi) = F (exp(pi)) is therefore also log-concave in pi. Thus, F (q)
is log-concave in log q. 
The conditions in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 allow to test whether a specific quality
distribution implies a unique market-clearing equilibrium by using simple calculus.
For illustration, consider the following example.
Example 1. Since ∂ log q = (1/q) ·∂q, f is log-concave in log q if q · (∂g(p)/∂q) ≤ 0,
where g(q) = q · (∂ log f/∂q). Assume that quality follows the Chi distribution such
that
log f(q) = (1− k
2
) log 2 + (k − 1) log q − q
2
2
− log
(∫ ∞
0
e−uuk/2−1du
)
(6)
for k = 1, 2, ... and q ∈ [0,∞]. Then, g(q) = k − 1− q2 and
q · ∂g(p)
∂q
= −2q2 < 0. (7)
5Note this assumption amounts to qf(q)f ′′(q) + f ′(q)f(q)− qf ′(q)2 ≤ 0 when f is smooth.
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Thus, the Chi distribution features a non-increasing elasticity of supply.
So far, as to the best of our knowledge, the only study to test for uniqueness of
the market-clearing equilibrium in the standard set-up for markets with asymmetric
information is Rose (1993), which offers a numerical investigation of quality distri-
butions. He starts from the observation that demand is decreasing in price if and
only if the elasticity of average quality ε = (∂q(p)/∂p) · (p/q(p)) is smaller than one.
I.e.,
ε =
p/t˜ · f(p/t˜)∫ p/t˜
q0
f(q)dq
[
p/t˜
q(p)
− 1
]
< 1, (8)
where f(q) is the density of quality, q ∈ [q0, q1], and t˜ denotes the sellers’ common
valuation of quality. Using numerical techniques, he shows that for most standard
distributions, the market-clearing equilibrium is indeed unique.6
Applying Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we are able to analytically reproduce all the
numerical results in Rose (1993). Moreover, we are able to show that the Pareto, the
Maxwell, and the power distribution feature a non-increasing elasticity of supply. It
is also straightforward to apply Theorem 3 to any other continuously differentiable
density function.
Theorem 2 and 3 relate to the results in Van den Berg (1994). He shows that if
1 − F (q) is log-concave in log q, log qf(log q)/(1 − F (log q)) is non-decreasing in
log q. Moreover, he finds that if f(q) is log-concave in log q, then, 1 − F (q) is log-
concave in log q. Comparing Van den Berg’s (1994) result and ours, Theorem 3
should imply that if F (q) is log-concave in log q, 1−F (q) is also log-concave in log q.
The corresponding proof will not be discussed in this paper.7
6Rose’s (1993) numerical analysis reveals that the gamma, chi squared, chi, exponential, log-
normal, beta (for specific parameter values), uniform, half-normal, Rayleigh, Students’ t, F-Ratio,
and Weibull distributions feature a non-increasing elasticity of supply. For the normal, extreme-
value, Cauchy, Laplace, and logistic distribution, however, the elasticity of supply is only non-
increasing for higher values of q.
7Bagnoli and Bergstro¨m (2005) find that if F (q) is log-concave in q, 1−F (q) is also log-concave
in q.
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6 Refined market-clearing equilibrium
The discussion of the unique refined market-clearing equilibrium is twofold. On
the one hand, it consists of the analysis of conditions under which only one of
multiple market-clearing equilibria is also a refined market-clearing equilibrium. On
the other hand, the uniqueness discussion also consists of the analysis of conditions
under which a unique market-clearing equilibrium is also a refined market-clearing
equilibrium. In this section, we will focus on the second part of the discussion. In
particular, we study the conditions under which neither buyers nor sellers willing
to trade at the unique market-clearing price p∗ have an incentive to unilaterally
announce a price p 6= p∗.
Suppose that the elasticity of supply is non-increasing and there is a unique market-
clearing equilibrium with p∗ for which S(p∗) = D(p∗).
Theorem 4. Assume εS ≤ 1/t1 for p ≥ p∗. Then, the unique market-clearing
equilibrium p∗ is also a refined market-clearing equilibrium p∗r.
To prove Theorem 4, we need to show that the condition in Theorem 4 is sufficient
for p∗ to be robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1]
and sellers with q ≤ p∗, i.e., we need to determine the conditions under which Lemma
1 is satisfied.
Lemma 2. Assume εS ≤ 1/t1 for p ≥ p∗. Then, tq¯(p∗)−p∗ > tq¯(p)−p for t ∈ [t0, t1]
and p > p∗.
Proof. Buyer t’s utility is higher at p∗ than at p if
∂
∂p
(tq¯(p)− p) = t∂q¯(p)
∂p
− 1 < 0 (9)
for all t ∈ [t0, t1] and p ≥ p∗. Rewriting (9) by using
q¯(p) =
∫ p
q0
qf(q)dq
F (p)
(10)
yields
∂q¯(p)
∂p
=
f(p)
F (p)
(p− q¯(p)) < 1
t
. (11)
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Thus, for buyer t’s utility to be decreasing in price for p ≥ p∗, it is sufficient to assume
f(p)p/F (p) = εS ≤ 1/t for p ≥ p∗. To make sure that the utility is decreasing for
all types t ∈ [t0, t1], εS ≤ 1/t1 is required. 
Intuitively, the utility of buyer t is decreasing in price if the decrease in utility caused
by an increase in price is larger than the increase in utility caused by the increase in
average quality. This in turn requires the increase in average quality and therefore,
the inflow of high quality sellers to be relatively small. Note that from t1 > 1 follows
that εS < 1 for p ≥ p∗.
If εS ≤ 1/t1 for p > p∗, p∗ maximizes u(p; p∗, t) as required in Lemma 1. But then,
p∗ is robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1] and
sellers with q ≤ p∗. Thus, the condition in Theorem 4 is indeed sufficient for the
unique market-clearing equilibrium to be the refined market-clearing equilibrium.
Figure III illustrates an example for Theorem 4.
εS Utility
1
t=4
p
p* t=3.7
1/t1 t=3.305
p*p
Figure III: Example for a unique refined market-clearing equilibrium
In the example, the size of the seller population equals one, whereas the size of the
buyer population equals four. The density of quality is given by f(q) = 1.2e−1.2q with
q ∈ [0, 4] and the density of preference types is given by h(t) = 1/3 with t ∈ [1, 4].
The left-hand side of Figure III shows the elasticity of supply which is non-increasing
in price for p ∈ [q0, q1] = [0, 4] and lower than 1/t1 = 1/4 for p ≥ p∗. Parameter
values are chosen such that demand and supply intersect at price p∗ = 2.18. The
right-hand side of Figure III illustrates the utility of unilateral buyer announcement,
i.e., u(p; p∗, t), for types t = 3.305, 3.7, 4. Thereby, t = 3.305 is the marginal type
at p∗. Thus, for all buyers with t ∈ [p∗/q¯(p∗), t1] = [3.305, 4], utility of unilateral
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announcement is decreasing for p ≥ p∗ and zero for p < p∗. As a result, p∗ = 2.18
maximizes the buyers’ utility from unilateral announcement and p∗ is robust.
7 Extension: Refined equilibrium without market-
clearing
Markets affected by adverse selection may not necessarily clear. There exists a
large literature on non-clearing equilibria and rationing in these markets. Empirical
evidence for the case where demand does not equal supply is delivered by King
(2008), for example. He finds that banks with high default probability may attract
less interbank loans than other banks such that these banks may not be able to fully
cover their individual demand for loans. This empirical result indicates the presence
of non-clearing in interbank markets.
In this section, we study the existence of a unique equilibrium price which is not
necessarily the market-clearing price. We thereby use a variation of the refined
market-clearing concept. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which a
unique price with excess demand or excess supply is robust to unilateral buyer and
seller announcements.
7.1 Set-up
Now, the unique price we are interested in does not result from a market-clearing
process. Instead, we assume that goods are supposed to be traded at a unique price
p′ which is the result of some price-setting mechanism. At this price, there may
be either excess demand where there are more buyers than sellers willing to trade.
Or there may be excess supply where there are more sellers than buyers willing to
trade. To check whether the price p′ is robust, we introduce both buyer and seller
announcements as defined in Definitions 2 and 3, respectively. In these definitions,
we thereby replace p∗ by p′ and D(p∗) = S(p∗) by either D(p′) > S(p′) for excess
demand or D(p′) < S(p′) for excess supply.
In this set-up, we call the equilibrium a refined equilibrium with either excess de-
mand or excess supply and define it as follows.
Definition 5. A price p′ is a refined equilibrium price p∗e with excess demand if
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1a) D(p′) > S(p′), and
1b) p′ is robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1]
and sellers with q ≤ p′.
Definition 6. A price p′ is a refined equilibrium price p∗e with excess supply if
2a) D(p′) < S(p′) and
2b) p′ is robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1]
and sellers with q ≤ p′.
7.2 Excess demand
Suppose that the price-setting mechanism results in a price p′ where D(p′) > S(p′)
such that there is excess demand and there are more buyers willing to trade at p′
than sellers.
Theorem 5. There is no refined equilibrium p∗e with excess demand.
To prove Theorem 5, we need to show that there is no price p′ with excess demand
which is robust to unilateral buyer and seller announcement (see Definition 5).
Lemma 3. The price p′ for which D(p′) > S(p′) is robust to any unilateral an-
nouncement of buyers with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] and sellers with q ≤ p′ if
p′ = arg max
p
u(p; p′, t), (12)
where
u(p; p′, t) =

0 for p < p′
pitq¯(p)− p for p = p′
tq¯(p)− p for p > p′
(13)
for t ∈ [t0, t1], and pi is the probability of purchase at price p′. In addition, sellers
with q ≤ p have to voluntarily forgo unilateral announcements p > p′.
Proof. Assume the trading price to be p′ with D(p′) > S(p′) and there is a buyer
announcement as defined in Definition 2 (with the adjustments mentioned above).
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The buyer with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] may consider to unilaterally announce p < p′.
Because all sellers willing to trade at p′ are able to sell their good at p′, no seller
will offer her good at a price p < p′. Thus, the buyer’s utility from unilaterally
announcing p < p′ is zero. If the buyer announces a price p > p′, all sellers willing to
trade at p will offer their good at p. Therefore, the buyer’s utility from unilaterally
announcing p > p′ is given by tq¯(p) − p. Finally, if the buyer decides to announce
p′, her utility is given by pi(tq¯(p′) − p′), where pi < 1. Thus, the buyer’s utility
from unilaterally announcing p is given by u(p; p′, t) for t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] as defined
in Lemma 3. If p′ maximizes u(p; p′, t) for t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1], every buyer with such a
type will unilaterally announce p′ such that p′ is robust to any buyer announcement.
Consider now the case where instead of a buyer announcement there is a seller
announcement as defined in Definition 3 (with the adjustments mentioned above).
Because the seller with q ≤ p′ is able to sell her good at price p′, she has no incentive
to announce any lower price p < p′. But the seller may consider to unilaterally
announce a price p > p′. To see that there are buyers who offer to buy at p > p′,
consider the following. A buyer’s utility from buying at p > p′ is given by tq¯(p′)− p
for t ∈ [t0, t1] and it is non-negative for buyers with type t ≥ p/q¯(p′) > p′/q¯(p′).
Moreover, the probability of purchase at p′, pi, changes only marginally if there is a
seller announcement p. Therefore, buyers with t ≥ p/q¯(p′) will always offer to buy
at p > p′. This is because the additional opportunity to buy a good at p weakly
increases expected utility. In case of offering to buy at p, the buyer is able to buy
the good at p with some positive probability and there is still the possibility to buy
the good at p′ with probability pi. In case of not offering to buy at p, she is only able
to buy the good at p′ with probability pi. Thus, as long as there are buyers with
t ≥ p/q¯(p′), the seller is able to seller her good at p > p′. Because p − q > p′ − q
for any q ≤ p′, a seller prefers p over p′. To definitely exclude the possibility that
a seller announces p > p′, we need to assume that sellers with q ≤ p′ voluntarily
forgo to unilaterally announce p > p′. Then, the price p′ is robust to any seller
announcement. 
Lemma 3 itself excludes the existence of a refined equilibrium with excess demand.
Without further adjustments in the set-up, sellers will not voluntarily forgo to uni-
laterally announce p > p′. Thus, p′ with D(p′) > S(p′) is not robust to seller
announcements. Moreover, a buyer with type t > p′/q¯(p′) has always an incentive
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to unilaterally announce a price p > p′ such that p′ is also not robust to buyer
announcements. To see why, consider the following.
A buyer with type t > p′/q¯(p′) unilaterally announces a price p+  > p′ if
pi(tq¯(p′)− p′) < tq¯(p′ + )− (p′ + ) (14)
for an arbitrarily small  > 0. Let  → 0. Then, inequality (14) amounts to
pi(tq¯(p′) − p′) < tq¯(p′) − p′. Because there is excess demand at p′, pi < 1 such that
(14) is satisfied with strict inequality. But then, there always exists an arbitrarily
small  > 0 such that (14) is satisfied and a buyer with t > p′/q¯(p′) will have an
incentive to unilaterally announce a price p > p′.
Intuitively, if there is excess demand at p′, a buyer can increase the probability
of purchase up to one by unilaterally announcing a slightly higher price p > p′.
This increases the buyer’s utility. Hence, any buyer with t > p′/q¯(p′) will always
announce some price p > p′ if she has the chance to do so. Moreover, to increase
the probability of purchase, a buyer willing to pay p > p′ will always offer to buy at
this price if there is a seller who unilaterally announces p > p′. Therefore, a unique
refined equilibrium with excess demand cannot exist.
7.3 Excess supply
Consider now the case where the price-setting mechanism results in a price p′ for
which D(p′) < S(p′) and there are more sellers in the market than buyers.
Theorem 6. Assume ∂εS/∂p = 0 for q0 < p ≤ q1. Then, p′ = q1 is the unique
refined equilibrium p∗e with excess supply.
To prove Theorem 6 we need to find conditions under which p′ with D(p′) < S(p′)
is robust to any buyer and seller announcements (see Definition 6).
Lemma 4. The price p′ for which D(p′) < S(p′) is robust to any unilateral an-
nouncement of buyers with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] and sellers with q ≤ p′ if
p′ = arg max
p
u(p; p′, t), (15)
where
u(p; p′, t) = tq¯(p)− p (16)
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for t ∈ [t0, t1] and p ≥ q0.
Proof. Assume the trading price to be p′ with D(p′) < S(p′) and there is a buyer
announcement as defined in Definition 2 (with the adjustments mentioned in Section
7.1). The buyer with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] may consider to unilaterally announce p < p′.
To see that there are sellers who offer to buy at this price, consider the following.
For sellers with q ≤ p, utility from selling at p < p′, i.e., p − q, is non-negative.
Moreover, at price p′, the probability of sale is strictly lower than one and changes
only marginally if there is a buyer announcement. Therefore, sellers with q ≤ p will
always offer to sell at p < p′. This is because the additional opportunity to sell at
p weakly increases the expected utility. In case of offering to sell at p, the seller is
able to sell her good at p with positive probability and she may still sell her good
at p′ with the given probability of sale. In case of not offering to sell at p, she may
just sell her good at p′ with the given probability of sale. Thus, as long as there are
sellers with q ≤ p, the buyer is able to buy at p < p′. In this case, utility from buying
at p < p′ is given by tq¯(p) − p. If the buyer unilaterally announces a price p ≥ p′,
all sellers with q ≤ p will offer their good at p. Therefore, the buyer’s utility from
unilaterally announcing p ≥ p′ is given by tq¯(p)− p. As a result, the buyer’s utility
from unilateral announcement p is given by u(p; p′, t) for t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] as defined
in Lemma 4. If p′ maximizes u(p; p′, t), every buyer with type t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] will
unilaterally announce p′ such that p′ is robust to any buyer announcement.
Consider now the case where instead of a buyer announcement there is a seller
announcement as defined in Definition 3 (with the adjustments mentioned in Section
7.1). Because the probability of sale is strictly lower than one at p′, the seller with
q ≤ p may consider to unilaterally announce a price q ≤ p < p′. Moreover, the seller
may also consider to unilaterally announce a price p ≥ p′. However, the seller will
not announce any price p 6= p′ if at these prices, no buyer is willing to offer to buy.
A buyer’s utility from buying at announced prices is given by tq¯(p) − p for p ≤ p′
and tq¯(p′)− p < tq¯(p)− p for p > p′ and t ∈ [t0, t1]. Thus, if p′ maximizes u(p; p′, t)
for t ∈ [t0, t1] as defined in Lemma 4, p′ certainly maximizes the buyers’ utility from
offering to buy at the announced price p. If the condition in Lemma 4 is satisfied,
no buyer is willing to buy at prices p 6= p′. In this case, the seller’s utility from
unilaterally announcing a price p 6= p′ is zero. She will therefore stick to p′ such
that p′ is robust to any seller announcement.
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To sum up, the condition in Lemma 4 is sufficient for p′ with D(p′) < S(p′) to be
robust to any buyer and seller announcements. 
It remains to determine the conditions under which Lemma 4 is satisfied. Let
pt = arg maxp tq¯(p)− p for buyer t ∈ [t0, t1]. Applying Athey (2002), pt is the same
for all t if utility is log-supermodular in (p, t). i.e.,
∂
∂t
tq¯(pˆ)− pˆ
tq¯(p)− p = 0 (17)
for q0 < p ≤ q1 and pˆ > p. Rewriting (17) yields pˆ/q¯(pˆ) = p/q¯(p). By replacing all
the inequalities in the appendix with equalities, it can be easily seen that ∂εS/∂p = 0
for q0 < p ≤ q1 is a sufficient condition for a constant price-quality ratio. Under a
constant price-quality ratio for q0 < p ≤ q1, tq¯(p) − p = p(t/c − 1) for q0 < p ≤ q1,
where c = p/q¯(p). The first order condition reads t/c − 1 such that tq¯(p) − p
is increasing for t > c and constant for t = c for prices q0 < p ≤ q1. Thus,
independently of p′, pt = q1 for all t > c. If p′ = q1, no buyer with t ∈ [c, t1] has
an incentive to unilaterally announce p 6= p′. Hence, given that S(p′) > D(p′) and
∂εS/∂p = 0 for q0 < p ≤ q1, p′ = q1 is the unique refined equilibrium with excess
supply. This proves Theorem 6.
The intuition underlying Theorem 6 is as follows. With a constant elasticity of
supply, the inflow of high-quality sellers does not change with price. Even though the
fraction of inflowing sellers decreases, the quality of these sellers increases. Hence,
the increase in average quality caused by an increase in price is such that the price-
quality ratio remains the same. Buyers therefore prefer higher over lower prices
because higher prices imply a higher average quality at the same price-quality ratio.
If, with excess supply at p′, the buyer’s utility of trading at p is everywhere increasing
in price for q0 < p ≤ q1 and decreasing for p > q1, this buyer prefers to trade at
p = q1. Hence, no matter whether sellers or buyers unilaterally announce prices, the
announced price will be p = q1. As a result, p
′ is a refined equilibrium with excess
supply as defined in Definition 6 if p′ = q1 with S(p′) > D(p′).
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For an illustration of Theorem 6, consider Figure IV.
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Utility
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q1= pt
p
S,D
q1=p*e
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Fig 4 Example for a unique refined 
equilibrium with excess supply
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t=p/q
0.14
1
Figure IV: Example for a nique refin d equilibrium with excess supply
In this example, quality q ∈ [0, 1] is distributed according to f(q) = 1.8q0.8, whereas
preference types t ∈ [1.5, 1.9] are uniformly distributed. The upper part of Figure
IV shows demand and supply and the possible range for p′ for which S(p′) > D(p′).
The elasticity of supply is constant and equals 1.8. The lower part of Figure IV
shows the utility of some buyers with type t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] as a function of the
unilaterally announced price p. Obviously, all buyers would unilaterally announce
p = q1 and sellers have no incentive to announce p 6= q1. Hence, p = q1 is the unique
refined equilibrium with excess supply if this price is the result of the price-setting
mechanism.
The unique refined equilibrium with excess supply requires a somewhat stronger
condition on the elasticity of supply than the unique refined market-clearing equi-
librium. This is because excess supply allows to unilaterally announce low prices,
which is excluded in case of a market-clearing price.
The application of Theorem 3 reveals that, among standard distributions, the uni-
form and the Pareto distribution feature a constant elasticity of supply. Another
example is the power distribution with F (q) = qa, where a denotes the elasticity of
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supply.
Note that there may be other conditions under which pt = q1 for all t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1]
and S(p′) > D(p′) such that p∗e = q1. Consider the first order condition of the
buyer’s utility maximization problem given in Lemma 4, i.e.,
∂
∂p
(tq¯(p)− p) = tεS
(
1− q¯
p
)
− 1. (18)
for t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] and p ≥ q0. Clearly, the utility of these types is increasing for
q0 < p ≤ q1 and positive at p = q1 if the elasticity of supply is everywhere high
and average quality is everywhere relatively low. However, if in some price interval,
the elasticity of supply is high, the average quality in this interval is also relatively
high (as shown in Ewerhart and Feubli, 2012). Thus, it might be difficult to find a
numerical example where indeed, the elasticity of supply is high and average quality
is relatively low for q0 < p ≤ q1.
We now briefly discuss equilibrium rationing. Based on the definition of credit
rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we define seller rationing in the adjusted
set-up as follows. There is equilibrium seller rationing if among the sellers offering
their good at p∗e, some are able to sell their good and some are not, and some of the
latter are not able to sell the good even if they offer a price p < p∗e. Obviously, there
may be seller rationing at p∗e = q1 with S(p
∗
e) > D(p
∗
e).
8 Extension: Multidimensional seller types
So far, we have worked under the assumption that the quality of a seller’s endowment
perfectly describes her reservation price. In a richer model, the sellers’ reservation
prices may differ from endowment quality. Such a set-up applies, for example, to a
situation where sellers not only differ in the quality of endowment, but also in their
stock capacity. A seller with a small stock capacity may have a lower reservation
value than a seller which offers the same quality, but has a higher stock capacity.8
In this section, we study the uniqueness of the market-clearing equilibrium in a set-
up where seller types are two-dimensional.
Assume that sellers are characterized by a pair, consisting of the quality of their
8The used car wholesale market, studied by Genesove (1993), is an example for this set-up.
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endowment q, and their reservation price v. Seller types are distributed according
to some strictly positive and continuous density on [v0, v1] × [q0, q1], where v0 < v1
and q0 < q1. Let f = F
′ > 0 be the density of v. A seller is willing to offer her good
for sale only if the market price p is weakly higher than her reservation value v. If p
is the single market price, supply at this price is given by S(p) = F (p). Moreover,
average quality at this price is given by q¯(p) = E[q|v ≤ p], whereas marginal quality
is m(p) = E[q | v = p]. Similar to the case with one-dimensional seller types,
demand at the single market price p is given by D(p) = 1−H(p/q¯(p)), where H is
the fraction of buyers with preference type ≤ t. In this set-up, the market-clearing
equilibrium is as defined in Definition 1.
For at most one market-clearing equilibrium, supply and demand as functions of
price have to cross at most once. Supply is zero for prices p ≤ v0, it is strictly
increasing for prices p ∈ [v0, v1] and constant and positive for prices p > v1. Because
average quality is not defined for p < v0 and constant for p ≥ v1, demand is not
defined for p < v0 and strictly decreasing for prices p ≥ v1. Thus, for at most one
market-clearing equilibrium, it suffices that demand is weakly declining for prices
p ∈ [v0, v1]. This in turn requires p/q¯(p) to be weakly increasing in price for p ∈
[q0, q1]. Because a seller’s quality of endowment and the reservation price may differ,
a weakly increasing price-quality ratio requires not only a non-increasing elasticity
of supply, but also an inelastic marginal quality. Denote the elasticity of marginal
quality by εm = ∂ logm(p)/∂ log p.
Theorem 7. Assume ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 and εm ≤ 1 for p ∈ [v0, v1]. Then, ∂D/∂p ≤ 0
for p ≥ v0, and the market-clearing equilibrium is unique.
Proof. The price-quality ratio p/q¯(p) is weakly increasing on the price interval
[v0, v1] if
∂
∂p
[
pF (p)∫ p
q0
m(q)f(q)dq
]
≥ 0. (19)
Rewriting (19) yields
∂
∂p
[∫ p
q0
qf(q) + F (q)dq∫ p
q0
m(q)f(q)dq
]
≥ 0. (20)
Define g(q, a) = (1−a)m(q)f(q)+a(qf(q)+F (q)) for a = 0, 1. Then, inequality (20)
amounts to the log-supermodularity of
∫ p
q0
g(q, a)dq in (p, a). Hence, ∂/∂p(p/q¯) ≥
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0 can be reinterpreted as
∫ p
q0
g(q, a)dq satisfying the single crossing property. As
log-supermodularity is stable under integration (cf., e.g., Athey, 2002), a sufficient
condition for inequality (19) is
∂
∂p
[
pf(p) + F (p)
m(p)f(p)
]
≥ 0, (21)
for all p ∈ (v0, v1). Rewriting (21) by using the definitions of the elasticity of supply
and the elasticity of marginal quality delivers
∂εS/∂p
εS(1 + εS)
≤ 1
p
(1− εm). (22)
It clearly suffices to impose ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 and εm ≤ 1 for (22) to be satisfied and
therefore, the price-quality ratio p/q¯(p) to be weakly increasing for p ∈ [v0, v1]. From
the definition of demand D(p) it follows that these two conditions are also sufficient
to obtain a weakly downward-sloping demand and hence, a unique market-clearing
equilibrium p∗.9 
Intuitively, for demand to be decreasing in price, the marginal type with t = p/q¯(p)
and therefore, the price-quality ratio has to increase with price for p ∈ [v0, v1].
Thus, as already seen in Section 4, this requires the increase in average quality to
decrease with price. A non-increasing elasticity of supply and a low elasticity of
marginal quality together lead to a decreasing inflow of sellers with high reservation
prices, whose average quality m(p) increases only slightly with price. Under these
two conditions, the increase in average quality indeed decreases such that the price-
quality ratio is increasing in price for p ∈ [v0, v1].
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we offered simple and sufficient conditions for a unique market-clearing
equilibrium in markets with asymmetric information. We showed that the market-
9With two-dimensional seller types, it suffices to impose εS < 1/t1 and m(p) ≤ p for p ≥ p∗ for
a unique refined market-clearing equilibrium. To prove this result, one rewrites ∂q¯/∂p < 1/t1 (see
Section 6) using the definitions of elasticity of supply and marginal quality. For a unique refined
equilibrium p∗e = q1 with S(p
∗
e) > D(p
∗
e), it suffices to add the condition ε
m = 1 in Theorem 6.
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clearing price is unique if the elasticity of supply is non-increasing. Our study re-
vealed that many quality distributions feature a unique market-clearing equilibrium.
In case sellers possess heterogeneous preferences, it suffices to additionally assume an
elasticity of marginal quality lower than one. To refine the market-clearing concept,
we introduced the possibility that either a single seller or a single buyer can decide
whether to trade at the unique market-clearing price. It turned out that in this
case, the unique market-clearing price is robust to unilateral price announcements
if the elasticity of supply is small. We extended our analysis by introducing the
possibility that units are traded at some price which is not necessarily the market-
clearing price. Thereby, we were seeking conditions to prevent sellers and buyers to
unilaterally announce a price different from the suggested market price such that
this market price is a refined equilibrium. We found that in this set-up, a constant
elasticity of supply is sufficient for a unique refined equilibrium with excess supply.
Our analysis shows that there is no refined equilibrium with excess demand.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we apply Van den Berg (1994) to show that ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 indeed suffices
for d log q¯(p)/d log p ≤ 1 to be satisfied for p ∈ [q0, q1].
By using the fact that d log q¯(p) = dq¯(p)/q¯(p) and d log p = dp/p, we write 1 ≥ d log q¯(p)/d log p
as q¯(p)/p ≥ dq¯(p)/dp for all p ∈ [q0, q1]. Rewriting it yields
q¯(p)
p
≥ f(q)
F (p)
(p− q¯(p)) . (A.1)
By multiplying both sides with pF (p), one gets F (p)q¯(p) ≥ pf(p)(p− q¯(p)) for p ∈ [q0, q1],
which in turn can be rewritten as∫ p
q0
qf(q)dq ≥ pf(p) (p− q¯(p)) (A.2)
for p ∈ [q0, q1]. Expanding the term in brackets on the right-hand side of (A.2) by
F (p)/F (p) and then rewriting the inequality by using the fact that F (p)(p − q¯(p)) =∫ p
q0
(p− q)dF (q) = ∫ pq0 F (q)dq yields∫ p
q0
qf(q)dq ≥
∫ p
q0
pf(p)
F (p)
F (q)dq (A.3)
for p ∈ [q0, q1]. The rearrangement of terms results in∫ p
q0
[
qf(q)
F (q)
− pf(p)
F (p)
]
F (q)dq ≥ 0 (A.4)
for p ∈ [q0, q1]. At q = p, the term in brackets of inequality (A.4) equals zero. Hence, if
qf(q)/F (q) ≥ pf(p)/F (p) for all q < p, inequality (A.4) holds. A sufficient condition for
qf(q)/F (q) ≥ pf(p)/F (p) for all q < p to hold is qf(q)/F (q) to be decreasing in q, which
is nothing else but the requirement that ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 for p ∈ [q0, q1].
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Chapter 2
Monotone Comparative Statics in
Markets with Asymmetric
Information
joint with Christian Ewerhart
1 Introduction
In a market where the units of a good differ in quality, sellers may be better in-
formed about the quality of a unit than buyers. Typically, sellers know the quality
of their endowment, whereas buyers only observe average quality of units offered
for sale. Because buyers cannot distinguish units of different quality, all units sell
at the same price. Assume that the quality of a unit equals the seller’s reservation
price. Thus, a seller offers a unit for sale only if the market price is weakly higher
than quality. As a result, the market with a single price is characterized by adverse
selection, i.e., a price only attracts units of relatively low quality. This in turn may
cause the market outcome to be inefficient in terms of what government, investors,
or market participants define as efficiency. For example, one inefficiency may be that
units of high quality are not sold, whereas units of low quality sell at a relatively
high price. To improve the market outcome, mechanisms such as screening (e.g.,
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), signaling (e.g., Spence, 1976), licensing (e.g., Leland,
1979), or other forms of governmental interventions may be introduced. However,
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the optimal design of such mechanisms requires the understanding of how a change
in the underlying market conditions affects the market outcome. Here, comparative
statics analysis of equilibrium trade volume and price is essential.
In this paper, we offer simple and sufficient conditions for monotone comparative
statics of the unique market-clearing equilibrium in the standard set-up of markets
with asymmetric information.1 Our first main result addresses equilibrium trade
volume. Intuitively, for equilibrium trade volume to unambiguously decrease, it is
sufficient that exogenous changes in the type distributions of market participants
have a negative effect on both supply and demand. We show that if exogenous
parameter changes lower supply, the elasticity of supply, as well as the aggregate
willingness to buy, equilibrium trade volume decreases. However, these three condi-
tions together do not allow clear-cut predictions of changes in the equilibrium price.
Our second main result therefore addresses equilibrium price. Intuitively, for equi-
librium price to increase, it suffices that the exogenous parameter changes have a
positive effect on demand and a negative effect on supply. We show that this trans-
lates into the requirement that the exogenous changes lower supply, and increase the
elasticity of supply and the aggregate willingness to buy. The combination of these
conditions leads to an unambiguous increase in the equilibrium price. However, it
does not allow clear-cut predictions of changes in equilibrium trade volume.2
We also study comparative statics of equilibrium trade volume and excess supply in
a set-up where market-clearing as an equilibrium condition is dropped. Equilibrium
excess supply is defined as the positive difference between equilibrium supply and
demand. Equilibrium trade volume is therefore determined by equilibrium demand.
In our third main result we show that in this set-up, equilibrium trade volume de-
creases if the reaction of the elasticity of supply and aggregate willingness to buy
to the exogenous change is negative such that there is a decline in demand. In
our fourth main result we show that if the exogenous change is such that it lowers
demand and the reaction of supply is non-negative, equilibrium excess supply in-
creases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
The model is outlined in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we derive sufficient con-
ditions for monotone comparative statics of trade volume and price. In Section 6
1For the standard set-up, see Akerlof (1970) and Wilson (1980).
2These results have appeared in a preliminary form in our IEW Working Paper No. 455.
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we study the comparative statics of excess supply. Section 7 discusses empirical
evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our study relates to several other contributions to comparative statics analysis in
markets with asymmetric information or under uncertainty.
In an applied study, Van den Berg (1994) examines the effect of changes in the job
arrival rate on the exit rate out of unemployment in job search models. In his set-
up, the probability of accepting a job offer depends on the job arrival rate and the
agent’s reservation wage, which itself is a function of the job arrival rate. Van den
Berg (1994) presents conditions under which the conditional probability of accepting
an offer is non-decreasing in the job arrival rate. Besides using a different set-up,
Van den Berg’s (1994) study differs from ours insofar as Van den Berg considers
conditions for monotone comparative statics of the individual participation decision
(probability of accepting a job offer), whereas we are also interested in the market
outcome. Moreover, in our set-up, individual reservation price and maximum will-
ingness to pay are exogenous.
Greenwald (1986) considers comparative statics in a two-period labor market model.
Employers are assumed to learn the employees’ individual ability during the first pe-
riod and they are given the possibility to adjust the individual wage for period two.
Depending on the wage offers for period two, workers decide whether to stay with the
initial employer or to change job by entering the secondhand job market. Greenwald
(1986) shows that in this set-up, an increase in the fraction of high-ability workers in
the population of job applicants both increases equilibrium wage and job turnover
in the secondhand labor market. Moreover, a mean-preserving spread in the abil-
ity distribution lowers equilibrium wage in this market. Greenwald’s (1986) set-up
goes beyond the standard set-up of markets with asymmetric information. This is
because he uses a dynamic framework and assumes that workers with reservation
wages higher than the secondhand market wage will enter the secondhand market
with positive probability. In addition, an employer’s demand in the secondhand
market not only depends on average ability in this market, but also on the mix of
abilities in her individual labor force.
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Comparative statics properties of the market outcome have also been studied with
respect to the information structure. Kessler (2001) shows that market performance
(aggregate surplus) is non-monotonic in the number of uninformed sellers. In Levin
(2001), sellers observe a private signal for quality, which is positively correlated to
the true quality. Levin (2001) concludes that trade is non-monotonic in the preci-
sion of signals. Daley and Green (2010) consider a dynamic set-up where buyers
periodically receive information on the value of assets offered for sale. Depending
on buyers’ beliefs about quality, more precise information either leads to less or
more delay in trade. In Kurlat (2010), buyers learn about quality by observing past
transactions. Less learning, caused by a market downturn, worsens future adverse
selection and may lead to a market breakdown. These studies differ from our study
insofar as we focus on changes in the market participants’ type distributions rather
than on changes in the asymmetry of information.
From a technical point of view, our paper partially builds on Athey (2002). Athey
(2002) considers stochastic optimization problems and establishes necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for comparative statics predictions. In particular, Athey (2002)
studies the choice vector of agents who maximize expected utility. Thereby, expected
utility averages over state-contingent utilities, where the distribution of states de-
pends on an individual exogenous parameter. Athey (2002) presents necessary and
sufficient conditions under which the agent’s choice vector is non-decreasing in the
individual exogenous parameter.
There exists also empirical literature on comparative statics in markets with asym-
metric information. We will discuss some of these contributions in Section 7.
3 Set-up
In this section, we present the set-up and discuss the unique market-clearing equi-
librium and the unique refined equilibrium. We thereby follow Ewerhart and Feubli
(2012).
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3.1 Market-clearing: price-taking agents
There is a market for an indivisible good and both buyers and sellers are price-
takers. We will later relax the price-taking assumption.
In this market, there is a continuum of sellers, whose population size equals N . Each
seller possesses one unit of the good and wants to sell it in the market. Endowments
across sellers differ in quality q, where q ∈ [q0, q1] with q0 < q1. Quality q is
distributed according to some density f which is strictly positive on [q0, q1]. We
assume that q not only describes the quality of the seller’s endowment, but also
perfectly describes the seller’s reservation price. Thus, a seller is willing to sell her
endowment only if the offered price p is weakly higher than quality q. From this
it follows that if there is a single market price p, supply at this price is given by
S(p) = N · F (p), where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of q.
There is also a continuum of buyers. The size of the buyer population is given by
J . Buyers have no endowment and want to buy one unit of the good. In contrast
to sellers, buyers cannot observe individual quality of some unit. However, they
are able to infer average quality of units on offer from price p. It is assumed that
buyers differ in their preference for quality, i.e., each buyer has a privately observed
individual preference type t ∈ [t0, t1] with t0 < t1 and t1 > 1. Preference types
are distributed according to some density h. A buyer is willing to buy a unit if
tq¯(p) ≥ p, where q¯(p) = E[q | q ≤ p] is the average quality of units on offer. Let
q¯(p) = q0 at price p = q0. Define H(t) as the fraction of buyers with preference
type ≤ t. If t is the lowest buyer type which is willing to buy at some price p, the
aggregate willingness to buy at this price is described by J(1−H(t)), i.e., the mass
of buyers with a preference type above t. Consequently, if p is the single market
price, demand at this price is given by D(p) = J(1−H(p/q¯(p))).
Given that both buyers and sellers are price-takers, we define the market-clearing
equilibrium as follows (see also Ewerhart and Feubli, 2012, for example).
Definition 1. A market-clearing equilibrium is a price p∗ for which S(p∗) = D(p∗),
i.e.,
N · F (p∗) = J(1−H(p∗/q¯)). (1)
In equilibrium, buyers and sellers willing to trade at p∗ are randomly matched and
units are bilaterally traded at the market-clearing price.
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We now present conditions for the uniqueness of the market-clearing equilibrium,
thereby referring to Ewerhart and Feubli (2012).
3.2 Uniqueness of the market-clearing equilibrium
For the market-clearing equilibrium to be unique, demand and supply as functions
of price are required to intersect at most once. From the definition of supply follows
that it is zero for prices p ≤ q0, strictly increasing for prices p ∈ [q0, q1], and
constant and positive for prices p > q1. Demand depends on the price-quality
ratio p/q¯(p). Because average quality is not defined for p < q0 and constant for
prices p > q1, demand is not defined for prices below q0, positive at price p = q0,
and strictly decreasing for prices above q1. Hence, as already shown by Ewerhart
and Feubli (2012), for a unique market-clearing equilibrium it suffices that demand
is weakly declining for prices p ∈ [q0, q1]. This in turn requires the price-quality
ratio to increase in price for p ∈ [q0, q1]. Define the elasticity of supply as εS =
(∂S(p)/∂p) · (p/S(p)). For an increasing price-quality ratio, it is sufficient to impose
a non-increasing elasticity of supply (see Theorem 1 in Ewerhart and Feubli, 2012).
Lemma 1. Assume ∂εS/∂p ≤ 0 for prices p ∈ [q0, q1]. Then ∂D/∂p ≤ 0 for p ≥ q0,
and the market-clearing equilibrium is unique.
The proof of Lemma 1 is equal to the proof of Theorem 1 in Ewerhart and Feubli
(2012) and is therefore omitted.
Intuitively, to get a declining demand function, the marginal buyer with t = p/q¯(p)
is required to be increasing in price. For the price-quality ratio p/q¯(p) to increase
with price, it suffices that the increase in average quality decreases with price. This
in turn requires that the inflow of sellers with high quality goods decreases with
price. A weakly decreasing elasticity of supply reflects exactly this requirement.
4 Comparative statics: Volume
In this section, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of trade volume in the
unique market-clearing equilibrium. In particular, we derive sufficient conditions on
the exogenous changes in the type distributions of market participants for equilib-
rium trade volume to unambiguously decline.
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For expository reasons, we introduce two independent markets MA and MB, each
as described in Section 3.1. It is assumed that the intervals [q0, q1] and [t0, t1] are
common to both markets. We capture all exogenous changes by assuming that mar-
ket MA is characterized by the initial vector (NA, JA, FA(.), HA(.)), whereas market
MB is characterized by the vector (NB, JB, FB(.), HB(.)), which may differ from the
initial vector in market MA. The elasticity of supply is non-increasing in both mar-
kets so that they feature a unique market-clearing equilibrium (see Lemma 1).
Before we turn to the analysis of equilibrium trade volume, we discuss an important
feature of comparative statics in markets with asymmetric information. As will be
shown below, average quality decreases for prices p > q0, if for these prices, the
elasticity of supply decreases.
Lemma 2. Assume εSB(p) ≤ εSA(p) for all p > q0. Then q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) for all p > q0.
Because the proof of Lemma 2 is somewhat lengthy, it is left to the appendix. For
intuitive insights, consider the following. A marginal increase in price causes average
quality to increase. This is because the marginal price increase leads to an inflow
of sellers with relatively high quality. If the elasticity of supply at price p is smaller
in market MB than in market MA, a marginal increase in price leads to a smaller
inflow of sellers in market MB than in market MA. Thus, the increase in average
quality in market MB is smaller than in market MA. Given that εB(p) ≤ εA(p) for
all prices p > q0, average quality is weakly lower in market MB than in market MA
for prices p > q0.
We now turn to the comparative statics analysis of equilibrium trade volume.
Theorem 1. Assume that
1) NBFB(p) ≤ NAFA(p) for all p,
2) fB(p)/FB(p) ≤ fA(p)/FA(p) for all p > q0,
3) JB (1−HB(t)) ≤ JA (1−HA(t)) for all t.
Then, V ∗B ≤ V ∗A , where V ∗i denotes the respective trade volume in the unique market-
clearing equilibrium in market Mi with i = A,B.
Proof. Let p∗A and p
∗
B denote the respective equilibrium prices in markets MA,MB.
If p∗B ≤ p∗A, then V ∗B = SB(p∗B) ≤ SA(p∗B) ≤ SA(p∗A) = V ∗A from condition 1. In case
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p∗B > p
∗
A, DA(p
∗
B) ≤ DA(p∗A) = V ∗A from Lemma 1 (proof can be found in Ewerhart
and Feubli, 2012). It remains to show that V ∗B = DB(p
∗
B) ≤ DA(p∗B), which, by
condition 3, reduces to the requirement that q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) for any p > q0. By
Lemma 2, condition 2 is sufficient for q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) to be satisfied for p > q0.
Hence, conditions 1 to 3 are sufficient for V ∗B ≤ V ∗A . 
Intuitively, for equilibrium trade volume to unambiguously weakly decrease as one
moves from marketMA to marketMB, the exogenous parameter changes are required
to have a non-positive effect on demand and supply. Clearly, a decline in both seller
and buyer population sizes has, ceteris paribus, a non-positive effect on supply
and demand. The supply reaction is also non-positive if (in addition) the quality
distribution changes in a way that it first-order stochastically dominates the initial
one (condition 1). In this case, the demand reaction is non-positive if two conditions
are satisfied. Demand depends positively on both aggregate willingness to buy and
average quality. Thus, if (in addition to the exogenous change in buyer population
size), there is a weak decline in both the aggregate willingness to buy (condition 3)
and the elasticity of supply (condition 2), the demand reaction is non-positive. It
follows that the conditions in Theorem 1 are sufficient for equilibrium trade volume
to be unambiguously weakly lower in market MB than in market MA. Note that for
V ∗B < V
∗
A , it is sufficient that one condition in Theorem 1 is a strict inequality. The
upper part of Figure I illustrates Theorem 1.
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Figure I: Comparative statics of equilibrium trade volume
In Figure I, both markets MA and MB feature a power distribution for quality with
fi(q) = εiq
εi−1 for i = A,B and q ∈ [0, 1], and a common uniform distribution for
buyer preferences. By calculation one can check that the price-quality ratio p/q¯(p)
in market Mi is constant and equal to 1+1/εi for i = A,B. Thus, demand in market
Mi is perfectly inelastic. In the upper part of Figure I, parameter values are chosen
such that the conditions in Theorem 1 are all satisfied with strict inequality.3 On
the supply side, FB first-order stochastically dominates FA and supply is lower in
MB than in MA. The lower aggregate willingness to buy and the lower elasticity
of supply imply a lower demand in market MB than in market MA. As a result,
3In particular, (NA, JA, FA, HA) = (80, 40, q
1.5, (t − 1)/1.2) and (NB , JB , FB , HB) =
(15, 20, q1.2, (t− 1)/1.2), where [q0, q1] = [0, 1] and [t0, t1] = [1, 2.2].
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equilibrium trade volume in market MB is strictly lower than in market MA. The
lower part of Figure I shows the case where condition 2 in Theorem 1 is violated,
whereas conditions 1 and 3 are satisfied with strict inequality. In particular, param-
eter values are chosen such that the elasticity of supply in market MB is higher than
in market MA. The lower part of Figure I shows an example where this leads to a
higher equilibrium trade volume in market MB than in market MA. Generally, the
violation of condition 2 in Theorem 1 leads to ambiguous comparative statics results
for trade volume. Because average quality is higher and the aggregate willingness to
buy is lower in market MB than in market MA, demand DB may be either higher or
lower than demand DA. Thus, clear-cut results for equilibrium trade volume are no
longer feasible. Similar arguments for conditions 1 and 3 show that unambiguous
predictions for equilibrium trade volume require all three conditions in Theorem 1
to be simultaneously satisfied.
There is an additional possibility for equilibrium trade volume to decline. If the ex-
ogenous changes have a strongly negative effect on demand and a small but positive
effect on supply or vice versa, equilibrium trade volume may still decrease. In this
case, the conditions on the exogenous parameter changes are required to determine
the sign and size of the effects on supply and demand. However, the size of the ef-
fect on supply and demand depends on the specific parameter values and ultimately
remains a numerical question. Therefore, this possibility will not be discussed in
this paper.
We now turn to the comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium price.
5 Comparative statics: Price
Consider markets MA and MB as introduced in Section 4.
Theorem 2. Assume that
4) NBFB(p) ≤ NAFA(p) for all p,
5) fB(p)/FB(p) ≥ fA(p)/FA(p) for all p > q0
6) JB (1−HB(t)) ≥ JA (1−HA(t)) for all t.
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Then, p∗B ≥ p∗A, where p∗i denotes the respective price in the unique market-clearing
equilibrium in market Mi = MA,MB.
Proof. To provoke a contradiction, assume p∗B < p
∗
A. Then, from condition 4 follows
that SB(p
∗
B) ≤ SA(p∗B) ≤ SA(p∗A). On the other hand, DB(p∗B) ≥ DA(p∗B) ≥ DA(p∗A).
The second inequality follows from Lemma 1 (for proof see Ewerhart and Feubli,
2012). The first inequality follows from conditions 5 and 6. Indeed, because of condi-
tion 6, it suffices to show that p/q¯A(p) ≥ p/q¯B(p) for p = p∗B. By Lemma 2, condition
5 is sufficient for this inequality to be satisfied. Because DA(p
∗
A) = SA(p
∗
A) = V
∗
A
and DB(p
∗
B) = SB(p
∗
B) = V
∗
B, DA(p
∗
A) ≤ DA(p∗B) ≤ DB(p∗B) = SB(p∗B) ≤ SA(p∗B) ≤
SA(p
∗
A). But then, necessarily, all the weak inequalities must be equalities. In par-
ticular, SA(p
∗
A) = SA(p
∗
B) = DA(p
∗
B) = DA(p
∗
A). From the uniqueness of the market-
clearing price follows that p∗A = p
∗
B, which is the desired contradiction. Hence,
conditions 4 to 6 are sufficient for p∗B ≥ p∗A. 
Intuitively, for equilibrium price to unambiguously weakly increase as one moves
from market MA to market MB, it suffices that the exogenous changes in the market
participants’ type distributions have a non-positive effect on supply and a non-
negative effect on demand. On the one hand, a decline in the size of the seller
population and an increase in the size of the buyer population, ceteris paribus, suffice
for supply to decrease and demand to increase. On the other hand, (additional)
changes in quality and preference distributions may also have the desired effects
on supply and demand. As we have already seen in Section 4, the supply reaction
is non-positive if (in addition) the quality distribution changes such that it first-
order stochastically dominates the initial one (condition 4). The demand reaction is
non-negative if (in addition to the exogenous change in buyer population size), the
aggregate willingness to buy and the elasticity of supply weakly increase (condition
6 and 5, respectively). It follows that the conditions in Theorem 2 are sufficient for
equilibrium price to be unambiguously weakly higher in market MB than in market
MA. Again, one strict inequality in Theorem 2 suffices for p
∗
B > p
∗
A. The upper part
of Figure II illustrates Theorem 2.
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Figure II: Comparative statics of equilibrium price
In Figure II, quality and buyer preferences in markets MA and MB follow a power
and a uniform distribution, respectively. Consider first the upper part of Figure II.
Even though supply SB is lower than supply SA, the distribution FB is chosen such
that the elasticity of supply and therefore, average quality is higher in market MB
than in MA. In combination with a higher aggregate willingness to buy in market
MB, demand DB exceeds DA for all prices q0 < p ≤ q1.4 As a result, the unique
equilibrium price is higher in MB than in MA. The lower part of Figure II illustrates
the case where conditions 4 and 5 in Theorem 2 are violated. More precisely, supply
SB exceeds supply SA at low prices and the elasticity of supply is much lower in
MB than in MA. However, the aggregate willingness to buy is higher in market MB
than in market MA (condition 6). Whether demand DB exceeds DA in this case
4In particular, (NA, JA, FA, HA) = (80, 10, q
1.2, (t − 1)/1.2) and (NB , JB , FB , HB) =
(15, 30, q1.5, (t− 1)/1.2), where [q0, q1] = [0, 1] and [t0, t1] = [1, 2.2].
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ultimately depends on the parameter values. The lower part of Figure II presents an
example where DB < DA for q0 < p ≤ q1 and p∗B < p∗A. In general, as long as some
of the conditions in Theorem 2 are violated, comparative statics of the equilibrium
price remain ambiguous.
The comparative statics analysis of equilibrium price reveals that the conditions
in Theorem 1 only allow to unambiguously predict differences in equilibrium trade
volume, but leave predictions of the equilibrium price ambiguous. For illustration,
consider Figure III.
p
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Figure III: The conditions in Theorem 1 do not unambiguously predict equilibrium
price
The upper part of Figure III shows the same example for Theorem 1 as the upper
part of Figure I. The example in the lower part of Figure III differs from the example
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in the upper part only insofar as the value of JB is lower.
5 Hence, the example in the
lower part still satisfies all conditions in Theorem 1 such that V ∗B < V
∗
A . However, in
contrast to the example in the upper part, p∗B < p
∗
A in the lower part. Similarly, the
conditions in Theorem 2 only allow to predict differences in equilibrium prices, but
not differences in equilibrium trade volumes. To illustrate this finding, we present a
example which slightly differs from the examples used so far. Consider Figure IV.
p
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Figure IV: The conditions in Theorem 2 do not unambiguously predict equilibrium
volume
The upper part in Figure IV shows an example which satisfies all the conditions in
Theorem 2 such that p∗B > p
∗
A.
6 Moreover, parameter values are chosen such that
V ∗B > V
∗
A . The example in the lower part of Figure IV differs from the example in
5In particular, JB = 20 in the upper part and JB = 5 in the lower part.
6In the upper part of Figure IV, (NA, JA, FA, HA) = (80, 20, 2/3(2.5q − q2), t − 1.8) and
(NB , JB , FB , HB) = (40, 50, 4/3(q − q2/4), t− 1.8), where q ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [1.8, 2.8].
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the upper part only insofar as JA is higher, and JB as well as NB are lower in the
lower part.7 Hence, the example in the lower part still satisfies all the conditions in
Theorem 2 such that p∗B > p
∗
A. However, in the lower part, V
∗
B < V
∗
A .
6 Comparative statics: Excess supply
The underlying intuition of the market-clearing equilibrium concept is that compe-
tition among sellers and buyers drives the price towards the market-clearing level.8
However, competition among market participants may not always be perfect such
that market-clearing may not occur. This could be the case if, for example, average
quality as a function of price is such that some buyers with price-setting power may
prefer to buy at a price higher than the market-clearing price.9 To be able to study
comparative statics of equilibrium excess demand or supply, we adjust the set-up
used so far and relax the market-clearing as well as the price-taking assumption.
We thereby stick to Ewerhart and Feubli (2012).
6.1 Non-clearing: a single agent with price-setting power
Now, the unique price we are interested in does not result from a market-clearing
process. Instead, we assume that goods are supposed to be traded at a unique price
p′ which is the result of some price-setting mechanism. At this price, there may
be either excess demand where there are more buyers than sellers willing to trade,
i.e., D(p′) > S(p′). Or there may be excess supply where there are more sellers
than buyers willing to trade, i.e., D(p′) < S(p′). Moreover, we now allow for the
possibility that one agent is given price-setting power, while all the other agents are
still price-takers.
Suppose that a single buyer is given some price-setting power. In this case, the
market works as follows.
Definition 2 (Buyer announcement). Assume that there is a price p′ for which
D(p′) 6= S(p′). Before buyers are matched with sellers and any trade takes place,
7In particular, (JA, NB , JB) = (40, 25, 40) in the lower part of Figure IV.
8For a thorough discussion of market-clearing and price-taking behavior, see Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston, and Green (1995).
9Sellers always prefer to sell at higher prices.
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one single buyer who is willing to buy at p′, i.e., a buyer with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1], is
chosen at random. This buyer has the possibility to announce the price at which she
prefers to buy. The announced price may differ from price p′. However, if the buyer
is indifferent between p′ and any other price p, the buyer sticks to p′. We assume
that all sellers can costlessly compare the announced price p with p′. Moreover, we
assume that all sellers who prefer p over p′ are equally likely to sell their unit at p.
Those sellers which cannot sell at the announced price may sell their endowment at
p′.
Suppose now that instead of a single buyer a single seller is given some price-setting
power. In this case, the market works as follows.
Definition 3 (Seller announcement). Assume that there is a price p′ for which
D(p′) 6= S(p′). Before sellers and buyers are matched and units are traded, a single
seller willing to sell at p′, i.e., a seller with q ≤ p′, is randomly chosen. This seller
has the possibility to announce the price at which she prefers to sell. The announced
price may differ from p′. However, if the seller is indifferent between p′ and any other
price, she will announce p′. We assume that all buyers can costlessly compare the
announced price p with p′. Moreover, we assume that buyers expect the quality of
the single seller announcing p to be q¯(p) for p ≤ p′ and q¯(p′) for p > p′. All buyers
who prefer p over p′ are equally likely to buy the unit at p. Those buyers who cannot
buy at p may buy a unit at p′.
We exclude the discussion of a refined equilibrium with excess demand because, as
Ewerhart and Feubli (2012) show, such an equilibrium does not exist. We define the
refined equilibrium with excess supply as follows.
Definition 4. A price p′ is a refined equilibrium price p∗e with excess supply if
1) D(p′) < S(p′) and
2) p′ is robust to any unilateral announcement of buyers with t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1]
and sellers with q ≤ p′, i.e.,
p′ = arg max
p
u(p; p′, t), (2)
where u(p; p′, t) = tq¯(p)− p for t ∈ [t0, t1] and p ≥ q0.
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For more details on the refined equilibrium with excess supply, see Ewerhart and
Feubli (2012).
6.2 Unique refined equilibrium with excess supply
In this section we determine the conditions under which there is a unique refined
equilibrium with excess supply.
Lemma 3. Assume ∂εS/∂p = 0 for q0 < p ≤ q1. Then, p′ = q1 is the unique refined
equilibrium p∗e with excess supply.
The proof of Lemma 3 is equal to the proof of Theorem 6 in Ewerhart and Feubli
(2012) and is therefore omitted.
The intuition underlying Lemma 3 is as follows. With a constant elasticity of supply,
the inflow of high-quality sellers does not change with price. Even though the
fraction of inflowing sellers decreases, the quality of these sellers increases with
price. Hence, the increase in average quality caused by an increase in price is such
that the price-quality ratio remains the same, i.e., the price-quality ratio is constant
for prices q0 < p ≤ q1. Buyers therefore prefer higher over lower prices because
higher prices imply a higher average quality at the same price-quality ratio. As a
result, for t > p′/q¯(p′), tq¯(p)− p is increasing in price for q0 < p ≤ q1 and decreasing
for p > q1. For t = p
′/q¯(p′), tq¯(p)− p = 0 for q0 < p ≤ q1. Therefore, a buyer with
t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] wants to trade at p = q1. Hence, no matter whether sellers or buyers
unilaterally announce prices, the announced price will be p = q1. Consequentially,
there is a unique refined equilibrium with excess supply as described in Definition 4
if the price-setting mechanism results in p′ = q1 with S(p′) > D(p′).
6.3 Comparative statics analysis
Consider two markets MA and MB, each as described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. Sup-
pose that the two intervals [q0, q1] and [t0, t1] are common to both markets. Market
MA is characterized by the initial vector (NA, JA, FA(.), HA(.)), whereas market MB
is described by the vector (NB, JB, FB(.), HB(.)). Assume that in both markets,
p′ = q1, Si(q1) > Di(q1) for i = A,B, and the condition in Lemma 3 is fulfilled.
Hence, both markets feature a unique refined equilibrium price p∗e = q1 with excess
supply.
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Theorem 3. Assume that
7) fB(p)/FB(p) ≤ fA(p)/FA(p) for all p > q0,
8) JB (1−HB(t)) ≤ JA (1−HA(t)) for all t.
Then, V ∗B ≤ V ∗A , where V ∗i denotes the trade volume in the refined equilibrium of
market Mi for i = A,B.
Proof. We first show that a change in the elasticity of supply has no effect on the
equilibrium price p∗e = q1. Given that the elasticity of supply is constant, tq¯(p)− p
reads p(t/c− 1) with c = p/q¯(p) and t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1] for q0 < p ≤ q1, and tq¯(q1)− p
for p > q1. From Lemma 2 we know that a decrease in the elasticity of supply implies
an increase in p/q¯, i.e., an increase in c. Thus, the slope of tq¯(p) − p decreases for
q0 < p ≤ q1, but the function is still increasing or constant for q0 < p ≤ q1 and
decreasing for p > q1, where t ∈ [p′/q¯(p′), t1]. Hence, buyers with t ≥ p′/q¯(p′) still
unilaterally announce p = q1. By Definition 4, this suffices for the equilibrium price
to remain p∗e = q1. Hence, in both markets MA and MB, p
∗
e = q1. According to
Lemma 2, condition 7 is sufficient for q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) for all p > q0. Thus, the
marginal buyer with t = p∗e/q¯(p
∗
e) is higher in market MB than in market MA. In
combination with condition 8 it follows that V ∗B = DB(p
∗
e) ≤ DA(p∗e) = V ∗A with
p∗e = q1. 
The intuition of Theorem 3 relates to the intuition of Theorem 1. However, in
the refined equilibrium with excess supply, the trade volume is solely determined
by equilibrium demand Di(p
∗
e) for i = A,B. Thus, for equilibrium trade volume
to weakly decrease as one moves from market MA to market MB, the changes in
the exogenous parameters are required to have a non-positive effect on demand.
Thereby, the effect of these changes on supply remains irrelevant as long as there
is still equilibrium excess supply. This is why in Theorem 3, there is no condition
equivalent to condition 1 in Theorem 1. A non-positive reaction in demand can be
achieved by either decreasing the size of the buyer population. Or it can be achieved
by (additionally) decrease the aggregate willingness to buy and the elasticity of
supply, i.e., the average quality of units.
Corollary 1. Assume that conditions 7 and 8 in Theorem 3 are satisfied such that
V ∗B ≤ V ∗A . If, in addition,
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9) NBFB(p) ≥ NAFA(p) for all p,
SB(p
∗
e)−V ∗B ≥ SA(p∗e)−V ∗A , where Si(p∗e)−V ∗i denotes the equilibrium excess supply
in market Mi for i = A,B.
Corollary 1 presents sufficient conditions for excess supply in the refined equilib-
rium to be larger in market MB than in market MA. That is, the difference between
equilibrium supply and demand increases as one moves from market MA to market
MB. Given that equilibrium demand is lower in market MB than in market MA,
it suffices that the changes in the exogenous parameters are such that equilibrium
supply is higher in market MB than in market MA. For supply’s reaction to the
exogenous changes to be non-negative, there are two possibilities. Either the exoge-
nous changes are such that the size of the seller population increases. Or the changes
(additionally) affect the quality distribution such that it is first-order stochastically
dominated by the initial, thereby satisfying condition 7 in Theorem 3. Theorem 3
and Corollary 1 are illustrated in Figure V.
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Figure V: Comparative statics of the refined equilibrium with excess supply
In Figure V, both markets MA and MB feature a power distribution for quality
and a uniform distribution for buyer preferences. In both markets, the elasticity of
supply is constant for q0 < p ≤ q1 with q0 = 0. Parameter values are chosen such
that Si(q1) − Di(q1) > 0 for i = A,B.10 Assuming that p′ = q1 in both markets,
p∗e = q1 with Si(p
∗
e)− V ∗i > 0 for i = A,B. In the upper part of Figure V, all three
conditions in Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 are fulfilled with strict inequality. Hence,
equilibrium trade volume is lower in market MB than in market MA. Moreover,
equilibrium excess supply is higher in market MB than in market MA. In the lower
part of Figure V, only conditions 7 and 8 are satisfied, whereas condition 9 in Corol-
lary 1 is violated. Given that the elasticity of supply and aggregate willingness to
buy are still lower in market MB, V
∗
B < V
∗
A . However, because the seller population
10In particular, (NA, JA, FA, HA) = (20, 40, q
1.5, (t − 0.9)/1.3) and (NB , JB , FB , HB) =
(80, 20, q1.2, (t− 0.9)/1.3), where [q0, q1] = [0, 1] and [t0, t1] = [0.9, 2.2].
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is now much lower in market MB than in market MA, SB(p) < SA(p) for all p ≥ q0.
Under these circumstances, comparative statics results for excess supply are gener-
ally ambiguous. In the lower part of Figure V, parameter values are chosen such
that equilibrium excess supply is lower in market MB than in market MA.
11
A refined equilibrium with excess supply may also feature seller rationing. Ewerhart
and Feubli (2012) define seller rationing in the standard set-up as follows. There is
equilibrium seller rationing if among the sellers offering their good at p∗e, some are
able to sell their good and some are not, and some of the latter are not able to sell the
good even if they announce a price p < p∗e. Obviously, there may be seller rationing
at p∗e = q1 with Si(p
∗
e) > Di(p
∗
e) for i = A,B. Hence, if SB(p
∗
e)− V ∗B ≥ SA(p∗e)− V ∗A ,
seller rationing in market MB may be higher than seller rationing in market MA.
Note that since p∗e = q1, the equilibrium price in market MB differs from the equi-
librium price in market MA if and only if q1 differs across markets.
7 Empirical evidence
In this section, we illustrate our theoretical results for trade volume, price, and ex-
cess supply with empirical comparative statics studies of markets with asymmetric
information.
An example for Theorem 2 is delivered by Genesove (1993). Genesove (1993) shows
that used car dealers with a higher propensity to sell obtain a higher price in the
wholesale used car auction. The wholesale used car auction, where dealers sell cars
to other dealers, serves as a possibility to adjust the composition of stock. Individ-
ual quality of used cars and the dealers’ stock composition are private information.
However, individual propensity to sell used cars is observable. Intuitively, it is ex-
pected that dealers having more used cars than they want also sell some used cars
of better quality, which in turn affects the price they get for their cars. To illustrate
our results, we group high propensity dealers and denote them as market MB. The
group of low propensity dealers is denoted as market MA. In Genesove’s (1993)
sample, 13.5 percent of used cars sold in the wholesale used car auction are offered
by sellers with high propensity to sell. Because the size of the seller population in
11In particular, NA, JA, FA, HA) = (80, 40, q
1.5, (t − 0.9)/1.3) and (NB , JB , FB , HB) =
(10, 20, q1.2, (t− 0.9)/1.3), where [q0, q1] = [0, 1] and [t0, t1] = [0.9, 2.2].
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market MB is much lower than in market MA, is seems reasonable to assume that
supply in market MB is lower than in market MA at every price p. We expect the
aggregate willingness to buy to be approximately the same in both markets because
in the wholesale used car market, there is a single auction for both types of sellers.
Using the propensity to sell as a measure for quality, average quality in market MB
exceeds average quality in market MA. Hence, it seems that the wholesale used car
auction delivers empirical evidence for Theorem 2.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) present a model which predicts that post-displacement
wages of otherwise observationally equivalent workers differ according to the cause of
displacement. Gibbons and Katz (1991) find empirical evidence that post-displacement
wages for laid-off workers are lower than those for workers unemployed as a result of
a plant closing. If the cause of displacement is indeed a signal for a worker’s average
ability, the study of Gibbons and Katz (1991) delivers another useful example for
Theorem 2.
In his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) discusses the problem that the elderly often
have difficulties finding appropriate (non-compulsory) medical insurance. Based on
statistical data for the U.S., he shows that the fraction of policy holders decreases
with the age of applicants. Inspired by Akerlof’s (1970) example, we use the Cur-
rent Population Survey 2005 of the U.S. Census Bureau (presented in DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor, and Lee, 2006, for example) to illustrate Theorem 1. Thereby, we do not
claim our example to be robust. We interpret the insurance market as follows. On
the demand side, there are insurers which are looking for policy holders in order to
keep their business going. On the supply side, there are agents which offer to become
policy holders. These agents differ in their reservation price, i.e., the maximum pre-
mium they are willing to pay for insurance. The individual reservation price depends
on the expected expenditures on health, where expenditures on health are assumed
to increase with age. Insurers cannot observe individual expected expenditures on
health. They are only able to observe the age of the agents, i.e., average expected
expenditures on health. Trade volume in this market is defined as the number of
policy holders. Denote the group of agents aged 35 to 44 as market MA and those
aged 55 to 64 as market MB. According to the Current Population Survey 2005, the
number of policy holders, i.e., trade volume, is higher in market MA than in market
MB. In particular, over the years 1987 to 1995, there were between 34692 and 43078
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thousand people aged 35 to 44, and out of these, 28353 to 31441 thousand people
had a private health insurance. In those years, there were between 20528 to 21641
thousand people aged 55 to 64 and 15735 to 17423 thousand people out of this group
were privately insured. For the health insurance market to be indeed an illustration
of Theorem 1, supply, the elasticity of supply, and the aggregate willingness to buy
have to be lower in market MB. Because the population size in market MB is no-
ticeably lower than in market MA, it is reasonable to assume that supply is lower in
market MB than in market MA for every premium. Since expenditures on health are
assumed to increase with age, average expected expenditures on health are higher
in market MB than in market MA for every premium. Thus, average quality and
the elasticity of supply are both lower in market MB. Moreover, we expect every
insurer to participate in both markets. Thus, the aggregate willingness to buy, i.e.,
the aggregate willingness to accept agents as policy holders, should be roughly the
same in both markets. To sum up, our example seems to satisfy the conditions in
Theorem 1, and the health insurance market seems to deliver empirical evidence for
our comparative statics result for equilibrium trade volume.
The market for private health insurance may also deliver empirical support for Corol-
lary 1. Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman (1995) use U.S. data on long-term care
insurance. They estimate that of the insurance applicants aged 65, between 12 and
23 percent would be rejected, whereas of those aged 75, between 20 and 31 percent
would be rejected. Denote the group of applicants aged 65 as market MA and those
aged 75 as market MB. The finding of Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman (1995)
hints towards higher excess supply of potential policy holders in market MB than
in market MA. Moreover, using age as an indicator for expected expenditures on
long-term care, average expected expenditures are higher in market MB. This im-
plies that average quality and elasticity of supply in market MB are lower than in
market MA. Thus, this empirical example seems to satisfy condition 7 in Theorem
3. However, because there are more applicants aged 65 than those aged 75, supply
in market MA seems to exceed supply in market MB, which contradicts condition
9 in Corollary 1. So, this particular example may not be a perfect illustration of
Corollary 1. Nevertheless, the example shows that the market for health insurance
may be useful to find empirical evidence for Corollary 1.
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8 Concluding remarks
This study has dealt with monotone comparative statics in markets characterized
by asymmetric information. It offered conditions under which exogenous changes
have predictable implications for volume and price in the unique market-clearing
equilibrium. The analysis revealed that equilibrium trade volume declines if supply,
elasticity of supply, and aggregate willingness to buy decrease. Clear-cut predictions
of changes in the equilibrium price require a different set of conditions. In particular,
the equilibrium price increases if supply decreases, and both the elasticity of supply
and aggregate willingness to buy increase. By dropping the equilibrium condition of
market-clearing, we were also able to discuss comparative statics of excess supply.
We showed that equilibrium excess supply increases if supply increases, and both
the elasticity of supply and aggregate willingness to buy decrease. By discussing
empirical studies of comparative statics in markets with asymmetric information,
we also delivered empirical support for our results.
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Appendix
Lemma 2. Assume εSB(p) ≤ εSA(p) for all p > q0. Then q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) for all p > q0.
Proof. Assume εB(p) ≤ εA(p) for p > q0, i.e.,
∂ logFB
∂ log p
≤ ∂ logFA
∂ log p
. (A.1)
Since ∂ log p = (1/p)∂p, this implies
∂ logFB
∂p
≤ ∂ logFA
∂p
. (A.2)
Integrating (A.2) over the interval [p′, p] for q0 < p′ < p yields
logFB(p)− logFB(p′) ≤ logFA(p)− logFA(p′). (A.3)
Applying the negative exponential function to both sides of inequality (A.3), we obtain
FB(p
′)
FB(p)
≥ FA(p
′)
FA(p)
. (A.4)
By another integration over the interval [q0, p] one finds
1
FB(p)
∫ p
q0
FB(q)dq ≥ 1
FA(p)
∫ p
q0
FA(q)dq. (A.5)
Using partial integration one can rewrite (A.5) as
q −
∫ p
q0
qfB(q)dq
FB(p)
≥ q −
∫ p
q0
qfA(q)dq
FA(p)
, (A.6)
which in turn results in ∫ p
q0
qfB(q)dq
FB(p)
≤
∫ p
q0
qfA(q)dq
FA(p)
(A.7)
⇔ q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p).
Hence, indeed, εB(p) ≤ εA(p) for p > q0 implies q¯B(p) ≤ q¯A(p) for p > q0. 
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Liquidity Injections
on Interbank Money Markets
joint with Christian Ewerhart
1 Introduction
One of the most important goals of central banks is to ensure price stability, i.e., to
keep the inflation rate at a low level. To achieve this goal, a central bank steers the
interest rate level in interbank markets by using open market operations. To lower
interbank market rates, the central bank conducts reverse open market operations
to lend money to banks. If the central bank wants to raise interbank market rates,
it uses open market operations to issue bonds.
The two main forms of reverse open market operations are fixed rate tenders and
variable rate tenders. If the central bank offers credit through a fixed rate tender, it
announces the interest rate the banks have to pay for one unit of credit and banks
bid the amount of credit they wish to transact. If the central bank uses a variable
rate tender, banks submit both the interest rate they are willing to pay and the
amount of credit they wish to get. In a variable rate tender, the central bank or-
ders the bids in a descending order and determines the market-clearing rate. Then,
banks with bids above the market-clearing rate receive central bank credits and pay
the market-clearing rate (multi-unit uniform-price auction) or their individual bid
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(discriminatory multi-unit auction).
Central banks differ in the usage of fixed and variable rate tenders. For example,
the Federal Reserve uses variable rate tenders to inject liquidity, whereas the Bank
of England and the Swiss National Bank offer liquidity mainly through fixed rate
tenders. The European Central Bank, in turn, switched between the two forms of
reverse open market operations. Historical practice and doctrine may be the main
drivers behind these preferences for a specific framework (see Bindseil, 2004). The
Bank of England, for example, always targeted short-term interest rates. It seems
natural that the Bank of England uses fixed rate tenders as a commitment to steer
interbank market rates to levels around the tender rate. The Fed, in contrast, is
more reluctant to take responsibilities for short-term rates, which makes tender rate
fluctuations in variable rate tenders less problematic. The reason why the European
Central bank switched from fixed rate tenders to variable rate tenders were not
changes in doctrine, it was the behavior of participants. The demand for European
Central Bank credits exceeded supply by far in fixed rate tenders which led to a
very small allotment rate. To decrease demand for central bank credits to a suitable
level, the European Central Bank decided to use variable rate tenders.
A natural question to ask is whether, besides doctrine and undesired allotment rates,
there are other factors a central bank should take into account when choosing one
of the two reverse open market operation frameworks. For example, there may be
interbank market characteristics for which one framework is more suitable than the
other.
In this paper, we focus on default and adverse selection as important features of
interbank markets. In particular, we study an interbank market with asymmetric
information on borrowers’ probability of default. That is, borrowers know their
individual probability of default, whereas lenders only observe the average default
probability of borrowers in the market. Because lenders cannot distinguish borrow-
ers with different default probabilities, all loans are settled at the same interbank
rate. As a result, the market is characterized by adverse selection, i.e., an interest
rate attracts only borrowers with relatively high probabilities of default. Therefore,
interbank loans may be traded at a relatively high interbank rate. This in turn may
induce the central bank to intervene. Observing the average default probability in
the interbank market, the central bank may offer central bank credits as an alter-
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native to interbank credits to keep the interbank rate close to some (lower) target
rate.
In this set-up, our results on fixed and variable rate tenders are as follows. First,
we find that in the variable rate tender (multi-unit uniform-price auction), there
are multiple pure strategy equilibria. However, all these equilibria lead to the same
outcome in the interbank market. Second, we show that both fixed and variable rate
tenders decrease the interbank rate because they lower the demand for interbank
credits. Third, it turns out that a variable rate tender may be the more effective
instrument because, while injecting the same amount of liquidity, a variable rate
tender may lower the interbank rate by more than a fixed rate tender. This result
is due to the fact that the fixed rate tender also serves borrowers with relatively low
default probabilities. For the relevant interest rates, the fixed rate tender lowers
the demand for interbank credits therefore by less than a variable rate tender. As
a result, the interbank rate is lower with a variable than with a fixed rate tender.1
However, the fixed rate tender is the more flexible instrument because it not only
allows to reproduce the variable rate tender’s effect on the interbank rate. It also al-
lows to fine-tune the interbank rate without the requirement to adjust the allotment
amount. Fourth, we show that by lowering the interbank rate, both instruments
increase social welfare, i.e., the sum of aggregate borrower, lender, and central bank
rents. Thereby, the increase in the aggregate welfare of borrowers and lenders is
larger with a fixed than with a variable rate tender. In contrast, the central bank’s
expected gains from lending minus the expected costs of an increase in the inflation
rate are larger with a variable than with a fixed rate tender.
Our paper reveals that indeed, the central bank’s choice of the type of open market
operations should not only depend on doctrine and historical practice. It should
also account for asymmetries in information on default probabilities and the re-
sulting adverse selection. If the interbank market is characterized by asymmetric
information on default probability, a variable rate tender may be preferable when
large decreases in the interbank rate are required to reach the central bank’s tar-
get. However, fixed rate tenders may be more appropriate if the interbank rate
requires fine-tuning. Moreover, the central bank may prefer fixed rate tenders over
variable rate tenders if it is interested in maximizing aggregate welfare of borrowers
1An intuitive discussion of this result has appeared in our IEW Working Paper No. 455.
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and lenders. However, the central bank may want to use a variable rate tender if
defaults on central bank credits are costly because they cause the inflation rate to
increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
The model is outlined in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce fixed and variable
rate tenders and study their effect on the interbank market rate. Section 5 discusses
the effect of the monetary policy instruments on social welfare. Section 6 contains
empirical evidence and a robustness analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
In this section we relate our paper to the literature and discuss selected contribu-
tions.
Our paper closely relates to Philippon and Skreta (2011), Tirole (2011), and House
and Masatlioglu (2010). Philippon and Skreta (2011) study governmental lending in
a credit market where there is asymmetric information on the default probability of
the collateral. In this set-up, the government is able to induce a lower equilibrium
interest rate if it competes with existing credit contracts by offering credits at a
lower interest rate. Tirole (2011) and House and Masatlioglu (2010) show that gov-
ernmental asset purchase programs increase the equilibrium asset price in a market
with asymmetric information on the asset’s return. The government can implement
a higher asset price if it buys the assets with the lowest return (see Tirole, 2011).
It can also implement a higher asset price if it fully replaces the demand side of the
asset market and buys at a high price (see House and Masatlioglu, 2010). Because
an asset can be interpreted as a claim on a counterparty,2 asset purchase programs
are similar to reverse open market operations, at least from a theoretical point of
view. Our contribution to this literature is that we distinguish between different
forms of lending programs and model the tenders as well as the behavior of tender
participants.
While the above mentioned theoretical studies form a uniform picture of the effect
of reverse open market operations on interbank rates, empirical findings are less
2See, for example, Tirole (2011).
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homogeneous. Wu (2011) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), for example,
find that TAF (Term Auction Facility) helped to reduce the level of the Londoner
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor).3 Wu (2011) finds that TAF permanently reduced
the Libor-OIS (overnight interbank swap) spread by 50 to 55 basispoints from 2007
to 2009. McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) find a similar reduction in this
spread from January 2007 to April 2008. This result, however, is contradicted by
Taylor and Williams (2009). Running several regressions, they cannot find robust
significant short-term and permanent effects of TAF on the Libor-OIS spread for
the years 2007 and 2008.4
There is a strand of literature which discusses the two tender procedures in more
detail. Thereby, these contributions focus less on the tenders’ effect on the interbank
rate but more on the bidding behavior of banks within these frameworks. Ayuso and
Repullo (2003) show that there are multiple equilibria in the variable rate tender.
Similar to our findings, these equilibria have in common that the marginal rate, i.e.,
the rate all successful bidders have to pay, equals the expected equilibrium interbank
rate. Ayuso and Repullo (2003) show that this result does not change if the tender is
discriminatory and bidders have to pay the interest rate they have submitted. Using
a similar set-up, Catala˜o-Lopes (2010) confirms the multiplicity of equilibrium in
the variable rate tender. In contrast to our set-up, these studies exclude adverse
selection and use a dynamic set-up where central bank credits are provided before
the interbank market opens. Empirical results on the banks’ bidding behavior in
variable rate tenders are delivered by Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004) and
Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011), for example. Using data on European Central
Bank repo auctions from 2000 to 2001, Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004)
show that the bidding behavior of banks is affected by the banks’ need for liquidity,
the amount and costs of collateral, and expectations of future declines in the inter-
bank rate. Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) study data on European Central
Bank auctions conducted in 2007. Their empirical findings support our results on
the variable rate tender and therefore, we discuss their contribution more detailed
3The term auction facility was constructed as a variable rate tender and managed by the Federal
Reserve. The final TAF was conducted on March 8, 2010.
4For the years 2007 to 2009, there exists evidence that the Libor was manipulated, i.e., the
submissions for the Libor calculation were chosen such that the Libor turned out to be for the
benefit of the manipulating banks. This finding may affect the empirical results on the Libor-OIS
spread.
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in Section 6.1.
There is also a line of literature which studies the banks’ equilibrium bidding behav-
ior in the fixed rate tender. This form of tender has been discussed mainly in the
context of over- and underbidding. Overbidding (underbidding) refers to the phe-
nomenon that banks submit very high (low) quantities, implying very low allotment
ratios (full allotment). Over- and underbidding may occur because bidders expect
the interbank rate to change in the near future (Bindseil, 2002), or bids do not have
to be covered by collateral (Nautz and Oechssler, 2003), or the central bank injects
less liquidity than needed because of its asymmetric loss function (Ayuso and Re-
pullo, 2003), for example. In our study, massive over- and underbidding in the fixed
rate tender is excluded because the borrower’s demand for credit is exogenous.
The welfare-improving effect of open market operations has been discussed by Allen,
Carletti, and Gale (2009), for example. In their paper, open market operations elim-
inate the interbank rate volatility which arises from the banks’ uncertainty of future
liquidity needs. This enables the interbank market to implement the constrained
efficient allocation. In Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009), the central bank
can provide liquidity at lower costs than the interbank market, which makes a cen-
tral bank intervention desirable. However, Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009)
point out that if the central bank fully replaces the interbank market, such inter-
ventions may also have a negative effect on social welfare because the market is no
longer able to aggregate information and to monitor peers. The authors also present
a short overview of the literature on rationales for central bank interventions.
Our paper also relates to the research on governmental interventions in dynamic
set-ups. These studies differ from ours insofar as the informed market participants
do not only differ in quality, but also in the trading delay they are willing to accept.
In Chiu and Koeppl (2011), participants with low quality assets want to sell as fast
as possible. Chiu and Koeppl (2011) show that in this case, a governmental asset
purchase program may jumpstart the market if it offers sellers with low quality as-
sets to immediately sell at a price which is attractive for them, but not for high
quality sellers. Guerrieri and Shimer (2012) show that a subsidy for anyone selling
low quality assets raises the price of these assets and increases trade volume of high
quality assets.
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3 Model
In this section we present the set-up of the unsecured interbank market. The set-up
is kept close to the standard set-up of markets with asymmetric information.5 More-
over, we define the market-clearing equilibrium, present conditions for its uniqueness,
and perform comparative statics analysis.
3.1 Set-up
There is a continuum of price-taking and risk-neutral borrowers, each endowed with
the same amount of cash L. Borrowers have the possibility to invest in an individual
project. Every project costs L + I, where I = 1. In case the project succeeds, it
returns X, and the probability of success is given by p. In case the project fails,
it returns zero. The projects differ across borrowers insofar as X(p) and p are
individual for each borrower. We assume that pX(p) strictly decreases with p, i.e.,
the higher the probability of success, the lower the expected return.6 Because the
borrowers’ cash holdings do not cover the project costs, they need an interbank
credit of size I. Borrowers pay (1 + r)I to the lender if the project succeeds, where
r is the interbank interest rate for one unit of credit. They default on the credit and
repay nothing if the project fails. We assume the outside option of not borrowing
and not investing in the project to generate zero utility. Thus, at interbank interest
rate r, a borrower seeks credit in the interbank market if and only if
−L+ p(X(p)− (1 + r)I) ≥ 0. (1)
Note that this implies X(p) > (1 + r)I and pX(p) > L. A borrower is indifferent
between the outside option of not investing and getting a credit and investing if
r = q(p) ≡ pX(p)− L
pI
− 1. (2)
For any interest rates r > q(p), the borrower prefers the outside option, whereas
for any interest rates r ≤ q(p), the borrower prefers to seek credit in the interbank
5For the standard set-up of markets with asymmetric information, see Akerlof (1970) and Wilson
(1980).
6A similar set-up where expected project returns differ across borrowers can be found in Ewer-
hart and Feubli (2012a), for example.
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market and to invest in the project. Hence, q(p) is the borrower’s reserve rate. The
derivative of q(p) with respect to p is negative such that the reserve rate strictly
decreases with the probability of success. This results from the fact that the expected
project return decreases, whereas the expected repayment to the lender increases
with p. Hence, a borrower with high probability of success and therefore, a low
probability of default, drops out of the interbank market at low interbank interest
rates. To keep the notation simple, we will write q instead of q(p) in what follows.
We assume that the reserve rate q is distributed according to some strictly positive
density f on [q0, q1].
7 Thus, if r is the single market rate, demand for interbank
credits is given by D(r) = W · (1 − F (r)), where W is the size of the borrower
population and F (q) is the cumulative distribution function of q.
There is also a continuum of price-taking and risk-neutral lenders with individual
cash surplus. Each of these lenders may offer a credit of size one in the interbank
market. Lenders know the functional relationship between p, X(p), and q, i.e.,
they know that p = L/(X(p) − (1 + q)I). So, if a lender observes q, she knows
p and X(p). However, lenders cannot observe a borrower’s individual reserve rate
q. They are only able to infer the average reserve rate q¯(r) = E[q|q ≥ r] from the
market rate r. Let q¯(r) = q1 at r = q1. Since lenders cannot distinguish borrowers
with different probabilities of default, all credits are granted at the same interest
rate. This, however, leads to adverse selection. At any interest rate r, only those
borrowers with weakly higher reserve rates are in the market. Thus, an interest rate
r only attracts borrowers with relatively high probabilities of default. The lender’s
expected profit from a loan at interest rate r is given by
pi(r; t) = p(r)rI − t(1− p(r))I, (3)
where I = 1, p(r) = E[p|q ≥ r], and t denotes the lender’s individual hedging type.
The lender is able to hedge against losses from lending in the interbank market
because her cash surplus may exceed one, the size of the interbank loan. The
parameter t measures the fraction of the loan which is not hedged (partial hedging).
Hedging types are distributed according to some density h on [t0, t1]. Note that the
lender’s hedging type is private information. For the lender’s expected profit to be
7Imposing an assumption on the distribution of q is equivalent to imposing the same assumption
on the distribution of p.
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non-negative at interest rate r,
r − t · 1− p(r)
p(r)
≥ 0. (4)
Thereby, (1 − p(r))/p(r) is the ratio of the average probability of default and the
average probability of repayment and denotes the expected relative riskiness of a
loan at interest rate r. Because borrowers with high probability of success drop
out of the interbank market at low interest rates, p(r) is strictly decreasing and
(1−p(r))/p(r) = 1/p(r)−1, i.e., the relative riskiness of a loan, is strictly increasing
in r. A lender is willing to offer her funds as credit in the interbank market if
r − tg(q¯(r)) ≥ 0, where g(q¯(r)) = 1/p(r) − 1 with g(.) strictly increasing in q¯(r).
We assume t0 to be such that r − t0g(q¯(r)) > 0 at r = q1, i.e., the lender with the
highest fraction hedged expects her utility from lending to be positive at the highest
possible interest rate r = q1. Define H(t) as the fraction of lenders with hedging
types ≤ t. If t is the highest lender type which is willing to offer credit at r, the
aggregate willingness to lend is described by J ·H(t), i.e., the mass of lenders with
a hedging type weakly below t. Thus, if r is the single market rate, supply is given
by S(r) = J ·H(r/g(q¯(r))), where J is the size of the lender population.
We define a market-clearing equilibrium in the interbank market as follows.
Definition 1. A market-clearing equilibrium is an interest rate r∗ for which S(r∗) =
D(r∗), i.e.,
J ·H (r∗/g(q¯(r∗))) = W · (1− F (r∗)). (5)
In our set-up, we exclude the possibility of moral hazard, i.e., the possibility that the
bank misbehaves and invests low effort to prevent the failure of the project. Instead,
we assume that each bank wants the project to succeed. The assumption builds on
the observation that in our set-up, the effort invested to prevent the project’s failure
seems to be naturally high. This is because the bank invests its own equity L and
therefore, it has some skin in the game.8
8This is in line with Kharroubi and Vidon (2009), for example. They find that banks pay
particular attention to the success of a project and the moral hazard problem is mitigated if banks
partially finance the project through equity.
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3.2 Unique market-clearing equilibrium
To simplify the comparison of the two tenders and their effect on the interbank
money market, we proceed with a unique market-clearing equilibrium. We thereby
apply Ewerhart and Feubli’s (2012c) results on the uniqueness of the market-clearing
equilibrium in a goods market with asymmetric information on the good’s quality.
For the reader’s convenience, we provide the details of this application.
Let εD = (∂D/∂r) · (r/D) denote the elasticity of demand. Moreover, let εg =
(∂g/∂q¯)/(q¯/g) denote the elasticity of relative riskiness. The elasticity of relative
riskiness gives the percentage change in the expected relative riskiness of a loan in
response to a one percent increase in the average reserve rate.
Lemma 1. Assume ∂|εD|/∂r ≥ 0 and εg ≤ 1 for r ≥ q0. Then, ∂S(r)/∂r ≥ 0, and
the market-clearing equilibrium is unique.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A1.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is as follows. For supply to be increasing in the interest
rate, it has to be more attractive for lenders to offer their funds at higher interest
rates. If the ratio of the interest rate to the riskiness r/g(q¯(r)) is increasing in r,
the payback from a loan increases by more than the expected riskiness of the loan.
Therefore, lenders prefer higher over lower interest rates. An increasing ratio of
the interest rate to the riskiness can be achieved by restrictions on the elasticity of
demand and the elasticity of the relative riskiness. If the elasticity of demand is
increasing in r, the percentage of borrowers who drop out of the interbank market
increases with the interest rate. But this means that the “market share” of marginal
borrowers, whose reserve rate is the lowest in the market, increases with r. Thus,
even though the average reserve rate increases with r, it does not increase as much
as the interest rate. Moreover, because the elasticity of the relative riskiness of loans
is low, an increase in the average reserve rate leads only to a relatively small increase
in the expected relative riskiness of loans. This is why lenders prefer higher over
lower interest rates and supply is increasing in the interbank rate.
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Figure I illustrates the unique interbank market equilibrium.
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Figure I: Interbank market equilibrium
In Figure I, reserve rates are log-normally distributed, whereas hedging types are
uniformly distributed, i.e.,
(W,J, f(.), H(.)) =
(
1, 1,
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ln(q−0.6)2
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0.257q
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,
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0.95
)
.
Moreover, to keep the numerical example simple, we assume L = 1 and E[X(p)|q ≥
r] = 2(1 + q¯(r)). In particular, we assume that for a borrower with reserve rate q,
the project return in case of success is twice the repayment to the lender at interest
rate q, i.e., X(p) = 2(1 + q). Thus, in the numerical example, g(q¯(r)) = q¯(r).
3.3 Comparative statics of the equilibrium interbank rate
Before we introduce reverse open market operations, we conduct a comparative stat-
ics analysis of the interbank market-clearing equilibrium r∗. We thereby refer to the
comparative statics results in Ewerhart and Feubli (2012b).
For expository reasons, we introduce two independent interbank markets MA and
MB, each as described in Section 3.1. It is assumed that the intervals [q0, q1]
and [t0, t1] are common to both interbank markets. We capture all exogenous
parameter changes by assuming that market MA is characterized by the initial
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vector (WA, JA, FA(.), HA(.)), whereas market MB is characterized by the vector
(WB, JB, FB(.), HB(.)), which may differ from vector (WA, JA, FA(.), HA(.)). The
elasticity of demand is non-decreasing and the elasticity of relative riskiness is low
in both markets such that they feature a unique market-clearing equilibrium (see
Lemma 1).
The comparative statics analysis for these interbank markets has an important fea-
ture. As will be shown below, the average reserve rate is lower in market MB than
in market MA for r < q1, if for these interest rates, the elasticity of demand is higher
in market MB than in market MA.9
Lemma 2. Assume
∣∣∣εDB(r)∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣εDA(r)∣∣∣ for all r < q1. Then q¯B(r) ≤ q¯A(r) for all
r < q1.
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in Ewerhart and Feubli
(2012b) and is left to Appendix A2. Intuitively, if the elasticity of demand is higher
in market MB than in market MA for every interest rate r < q1, the market share
of marginal borrowers with the lowest reserve rate is higher in market MB at these
interest rates. Thus, the average reserve rate is everywhere lower in market MB than
in market MA. Recall that g(q¯(r)) is strictly increasing in q¯(r). Thus, g(q¯B(r)) ≤
g(q¯A(r)) such that market MB is less risky than market MA.
We now turn to the comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium interbank rate
r∗.10
Proposition 1. Assume that
1) WB
(
1− FB(r)) ≤ WA (1− FA(r)) for all r ≤ q1,
2) fB(r)/(1− FB(r)) ≥ fA(r)/(1− FA(r)) for all r < q1
3) JBHB(t) ≥ JAHA(t) for all t.
Then, rB ≤ rA, where ri denotes the respective interest rate in the unique market-
clearing equilibrium in interbank market M i = MA,MB.
9Ewerhart and Feubli (2012b) derive a similar result for goods markets and show that the
average quality of goods is higher with a higher elasticity of supply.
10See Ewerhart and Feubli (2012b) for a similar comparative statics result for equilibrium price
in goods markets.
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is left to Appendix A3.
Intuitively, for the market-clearing equilibrium interest rate to decrease as one moves
from market MA to market MB, it suffices that the exogenous parameter changes
have a non-positive effect on demand and a non-negative effect on supply. Consider
the case where the size of borrower and lender populations are the same in both
markets, i.e., WB = WA and JB = JA. For the demand reaction to be non-positive,
the reserve rate distribution has to change such that it first-order stochastically
dominates the initial distribution (condition 1). In this case, the supply reaction is
non-negative if two conditions are satisfied. Supply depends positively on both the
distribution of lender types t and the expected relative riskiness of a loan, g(q¯(r)).
Thus, if there is an increase in the elasticity of demand (condition 2) and the willing-
ness to lend weakly increases (condition 3), the supply reaction is non-negative. It
follows that the conditions in Theorem 1 are sufficient for the equilibrium interbank
rate to be unambiguously weakly lower in market MB than in market MA.
4 Reverse open market operations
We now introduce reverse open market operations through which a central bank
offers k > 0 central bank credits of size one to interbank borrowers.
If a central bank decides to conduct a reverse open market operation, it announces
terms and conditions for central bank credits as soon as the interbank market opens.
The central bank knows the functional relationship between p, X(p), and q, but only
observes the type distributions F and H and cannot distinguish borrower types. For
borrowers in the interbank market, a central bank credit is the alternative funding
option which is chosen if it generates a utility as least as high as the utility from an
interbank credit. Those borrowers who get a central bank credit do not seek credit
the interbank market. Those borrowers who apply for a central bank credit but are
denied may seek an interbank credit.
We now turn to the details of fixed and variable rate tenders and discuss their effect
on the unique interbank market rate.
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4.1 Fixed rate tender
If the central bank offers credit through a fixed rate tender, it announces the vector
(k, rI), where k denotes the amount of central bank credits and rI denotes the
interest rate it charges for a central bank credit. The interest rate rI is the same
for all borrowers. Each borrower may then apply for one central bank credit. If
there are more than k borrowers applying for a central bank credit, the central bank
randomly chooses k applicants and serves each with a credit.
We use standard definitions to describe demand and supply in the interbank market
with a fixed rate tender. Residual demand is the difference between total demand
and demand that has been supplied by the central bank. Hence, for any given rI
and k, residual demand equals
DF (r; rI , k) =
D(r) for r < rID(r) · x for r ≥ rI , (6)
where x = 1−k/D(rI). If the interbank market rate r is lower than rI , all borrowers
prefer interbank credits over central bank credits such that no borrower applies for
a central bank credit. For interbank market rates r ≥ rI , demand for central bank
credits is given by D(rI), and the fraction k/D(rI) is supplied with a central bank
credit. Residual supply is given by
SF (r; rI , k) = J ·H
(
r
g(q¯F (r))
)
(7)
for interest rates r ≤ q1, where q¯F (r) is the residual average reserve rate in the
market. We exclude the possibility that a reverse open market operation changes
the distribution of t, i.e., the distribution of the lenders’ hedging types.
The market-clearing equilibrium in the interbank market with a fixed rate tender is
defined as follows.
Definition 2. Given the vector (rI , k), a market-clearing equilibrium in the in-
terbank market with a fixed rate tender is an interest rate rF for which SF (rF ) =
DF (rF ).
Theorem 1. Assume k ≤ D(rI)−S(rI) and rI < r∗. Then, rF exists and rF < r∗.
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Proof. To prove Theorem 1, we will first show that rF exists. In contrast to
demand, there is a discontinuity in residual demand as a function of the interest
rate. In particular, there is a discontinuous drop in residual demand at interest rate
r = rI , where it drops from DF (r) = D(r) to DF (r) = D(r) − k. However, the
definition of the market-clearing equilibrium requires that at rF , residual demand
and residual supply intersect. If k ≤ D(rI) − S(rI) and rI < r∗, DF (rI) ≥ SF (rI)
such that by Lemma 1, residual demand and residual supply indeed intersect and
rF exists.
We now prove that the effect of a fixed rate tender fulfills all three conditions in
Proposition 1 such that rF ≤ r∗. Condition 1 in Proposition 1 requires that DF (r) ≤
D(r) for all r ≤ q1. Because k ≤ D(rI)− S(rI), x = 1− k/D(rI) < 1. Then, from
(6) it follows that indeed, DF (r) ≤ D(r) for all r ≤ q1.
Condition 2 in Proposition 1 requires that εD
F
(r) ≥ εD(r) for all r < q1. For
interest rates r < rI , residual demand equals demand such that the elasticity of
residual demand is the same as the elasticity of demand. For interest rates r > rI ,
the elasticity of residual demand is defined as
εD
F
(r) =
∂DF (r)
∂r
· r
DF (r)
=
∂D(r)x
∂r
· r
D(r)x
=
∂D(r)
∂r
· r
D(r)
. (8)
At r = rI , εD
F
(r) > εD(r). Thus, the elasticity of residual demand is the same
as the elasticity of demand except at interest rate r = rI , where it is higher than
the elasticity of demand. Because residual supply depends on the residual average
reserve rate, consider the following. Residual density of reserve rates is given by
fF (q) = f(q) for r < rI and fF (q) = xf(q) for r ≥ rI . Hence, the probability
that q is weakly higher than r reads 1− F (r) for r < rI because at these interbank
rates, borrowers do not participate in the fixed rate tender. However, for r ≥ rI ,
(1− F (r))x. Thus, the residual average reserve rate is q¯F (r) = q¯(r) for r < rI and
q¯F (r) =
x
∫ q1
r
qf(q)dq
x(1− F (r)) =
∫ q1
r
qf(q)dq
1− F (r) = q¯(r) (9)
for r ≥ rI . Thus, the fixed rate tender has no effect on the average reserve rate.
From this it follows that g(q¯F (r)) = g(q¯(r)) for r ≤ q1.
Condition 3 requires that JHF (t) = JH(t) for all t. This condition is satisfied by
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assumption. From the discussion of the residual average reserve rate it follows that
SF (r) = J ·H(r/g(q¯F (r))) = J ·H(r/g(q¯(r))) = S(r) for all interbank rates r ≥ q0.
Hence, because all conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, rF ≤ r∗.
Finally, we prove that rF < r∗. If rI ≥ r∗, rF = r∗. This follows from DF (r) = D(r)
and SF (r) = S(r) for r ≤ rI , which in turn follows from equations (6), (7), and
the fact that q¯F (r) = q¯(r) for r ≤ rI . However, if rI < r∗, DF (r) < D(r), whereas
SF (r) = S(r) for r ≥ rI . Hence, rF < r∗. Note that in case k = D(rI) − S(rI),
rF = rI , otherwise, rF > rI . 
Intuitively, a fixed rate tender lowers the equilibrium interbank rate because it low-
ers demand for interbank credits at high interest rates. However, a fixed rate tender
has no effect on supply of interbank credits. Even though some borrowers drop
out of the interbank market at high interest rates, the distribution of reserve rates
remains the same because the drop-out group is a random selection of borrowers
with q ≥ rI . Therefore, there is no change in the ratio of the interest rate to the
riskiness r/g(q¯(r)) at high interest rates.
Theorem 1 describes a fixed rate tender with a set (rI , k) such that interbank cred-
its get cheaper, but are still more expensive than central bank credits. Figure II
illustrates the equilibrium in the interbank market with and without a fixed rate
tender.
r
S=SFr/g 
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Figure II: Fixed rate tender: impact on interbank market rate
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In Figure II, the interbank market without intervention is characterized by the same
vector as the market in Figure I. Moreover, (k, rI) = (0.3, 1.2). For interest rates
r ≥ rI , residual demand is proportional to demand because k randomly chosen
borrowers with q ≥ rI are able to use the central bank credit as an alternative
funding option and drop out of the interbank market. This, however, does not
change supply such that residual supply as a function of the interest rate equals
supply in the market without intervention. Because there is a drop in demand
for interbank credits at higher interest rates, the equilibrium interbank market rate
declines. In the example, the equilibrium interbank market rate drops from r∗ = 1.79
to rF = 1.59.
4.2 Variable rate tender
Instead of a fixed rate tender, a central bank may also offer the same amount of
central bank credits through a variable rate tender, i.e., a sealed-bid multi-unit
uniform-rate auction. In this case, the central bank only announces k. All borrowers
may then submit a bid, i.e., an interest rate they are willing to pay for a central
bank credit. Denote the bid of the borrower with reserve rate q by bq. It is assumed
that borrowers choose the bid at random if they are indifferent between any available
strategies. The individual bids are not publicly observable. The central bank collects
the bids and sorts them in a descending order. The borrower with the highest bid
is served first. Then, the central bank subsequently serves borrowers with lower
bids until the central bank credits are exhausted. If there are several bidders who
submit a bid equal to the kth highest bid, the central bank randomizes over these
bidders. We define a successful bidder as a borrower who receives a central bank
credit. All successful bidders pay the same interest rate rT . This interest rate is
set by the central bank after the borrowers submitted the bids and is such that k
bids are weakly higher than rT . We assume that borrowers anticipate the price-
setting behavior of the central bank, i.e., they anticipate rT before it is publicly
observable. Borrowers who are denied a central bank credit may apply for credit
in the interbank market. The unique market-clearing equilibrium in an interbank
market with a variable rate tender is given by rV . It is perfectly anticipated by the
borrowers. We assume that k < D(rV ).11
11I.e., central bank credits are scarce.
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Definition 3 (Tender equilibrium). For any given rV , the pure strategy equilib-
rium in the variable rate tender with scarce central bank credits is a strategy profile
b = (bq0 , ..., bq1) and a resulting interest rate r
T such that
1) bq is the best response to all other borrowers’ strategies b−q
2) The mass of bidders with an equilibrium strategy bq ≥ rT equals k or is weakly
higher than k if there are several bidders submitting the kth highest bid.
Denote the mass of successful bidders with q ≥ r as (1− xV (r))D(r). For any given
k and rT , residual demand is given by
DV (r; rT , k) =
D(r) for r < rTD(r) · xV (r) for r ≥ rT . (10)
Residual supply is given by
SV (r; rT , k) = J ·H
(
r
g(q¯V (r))
)
(11)
for interest rates r ≤ q1, where q¯V (r) is the residual average reserve rate in this
market.
We define the market-clearing equilibrium in the interbank market with a variable
rate tender as follows.
Definition 4 (Interbank equilibrium). Given the vector (k, rT ), the market-
clearing equilibrium in the interbank market with a variable rate tender is an interest
rate rV for which SV (rV ) = DV (rV ).
In the following, we first discuss the equilibrium in the variable rate tender (Defini-
tion 3). We then turn to the equilibrium in the interbank market with a variable
rate tender (Definition 4) and compare it to the equilibrium in the interbank market
without any intervention.
Theorem 2. For any given rV , any equilibrium in the variable rate tender is such
that
1) rT = rV
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2) Only those borrowers with q ≥ rV may submit bq ≥ rV .
Proof. We prove Theorem 2 in four steps. First, the mass of borrowers bidding
bq > r
V is smaller than k. If not, the kth highest bid is above rV and rT > rV .
Accordingly, each of the k successful bidders pays more for a central bank credit
than for an interbank credit. Hence, for these bidders it is a profitable deviation to
reduce the bid to rV . This implies that rT is at most rV .
Second, the mass of borrowers bidding bq ≥ rV cannot be smaller than k. Otherwise,
the kth highest bid is below rV and rT < rV . This requires that because D(rV ) > k,
some of the borrowers with q ≥ rV submit a bid bq < rT < rV < q. Accordingly, each
of the k successful bidders pays less for a central bank credit than for an interbank
credit. Hence, for those borrowers with bq < r
T < rV < q, it is a profitable deviation
to raise the bid to rT ≤ bq < rV ≤ q. This implies that rT is at least rV .
Third, it follows that the only possible candidate for an equilibrium as described in
Definition 3 is rT = rV .
Fourth, rT = rV is indeed an equilibrium and only those borrowers with q ≥ rV
may submit bq ≥ rV . If rT = rV , central bank credits are as expensive as interbank
credits. Accordingly, any borrower with q ≥ rV is indifferent between being a
successful bidder and submitting a losing bid. Hence, these borrowers may choose
any bid because each bid leads to the same profit. Having chosen a bid, there is no
profitable deviation if rT = rV . The probability to be a successful bidder is positive
if a borrower submits a bid bq ≥ rV . Hence, borrowers with q < rV will not submit a
bid bq ≥ rV because for these borrowers it is not profitable to pay rV . Hence, these
borrowers may choose any bid below rV , and each of these bids leads to the same
profit. Having chosen a bid below rV , there is no profitable deviation if rT = rV . 
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Figure III helps to gain an intuition for Theorem 2.
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Figure III: Equilibrium in the variable rate tender
As illustrated in Figure III, any rT > rV cannot be an equilibrium because successful
bidders are not willing to pay more for a central bank credit than for an interbank
credit and therefore, they have an incentive to deviate from their strategy. Any
rT < rV cannot be an equilibrium because borrowers with q ≥ rV and bq < rT want
to be successful bidders and therefore, they have an incentive to deviate from their
strategy.12
The equilibrium in the variable rate tender as described in Theorem 2 is not unique.
There is a continuum of strategy profiles b = (bq0 , ..., bq1) satisfying Definition 3
and the conditions in Theorem 2. The multiplicity of equilibrium results from the
fact that if rT = rV , borrowers are indifferent between central bank and interbank
credits. Fortunately, all these equilibria have in common that they lead to the same
outcome in the interbank market with a variable rate tender. In the following, we
will first discuss one specific variable rate tender equilibrium and the resulting in-
terbank market rate rV . Then, at the end of this section, we will show that all
variable rate tender equilibria described in Definition 3 and Theorem 2 lead to this
particular level of rV .
12The variable rate tender differs from standard multi-unit uniform-price auctions insofar as in
the variable rate tender, the borrowers’ bids not only depend on their individual reserve rate, but
also on the interest rate rV , i.e., the interest rate for an interbank credit. For a comprehensive
analysis of standard multi-unit uniform-price auctions, see Krishna (2010), for example.
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Among the equilibria which are compatible with Theorem 2, we single out a partic-
ularly plausible one and describe it in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. For a given rV , one equilibrium in the variable rate tender is such that
rT = rV , and borrowers with q < rV submit a bid bq = q, whereas borrowers with
q ≥ rV submit the bid bq = rV .
Proof. Follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
In the equilibrium described in Lemma 4, D(rV ) borrowers submit a bid bq = r
V .
Thus, residual demand is given by (10) with xV = 1 − k/D(rV ). The reason for
DV (r) = D(r) at interest rates r < rV is that borrowers anticipate rT . If, for some
reason, the interest rate in the interbank market with a variable rate tender lies
below rT , borrowers prefer interbank credits over central bank credits.
Theorem 3. Given k < D(rV ) and the tender equilibrium described in Lemma 4,
rV < r∗.
Proof. To prove Theorem 3, we will first prove that all three conditions in Propo-
sition 1 are fulfilled and rV ≤ r∗. Condition 1 in Proposition 1 requires that
DV (r) ≤ D(r) for all r ≤ q1. Because k < D(rV ), xV = 1 − k/D(rV ) < 1.
Then, from (10) it follows that indeed, DV (r) ≤ D(r) for all r ≤ q1.
Condition 2 in Proposition 1 requires that εD
V
(r) ≥ εD(r) for all r < q1. For interest
rates r < rV , residual demand equals demand such that the elasticity of residual
demand equals the elasticity of demand. For interest rates r > rV ,
εD
V
=
∂DV (r)
∂r
· r
DV (r)
=
∂D(r)xV
∂r
· r
D(r)xV
=
∂D(r)
∂r
· r
D(r)
. (12)
At r = rV , εD
V
(r) > εD(r). Thus, the elasticity of residual demand is the same
as the elasticity of demand except at r = rV , where it is higher than the elasticity
of demand. Because residual supply depends on the residual average reserve rate,
consider the following. The residual average reserve rate is q¯V (r) = q¯(r) for interest
rates r < rV because for these interest rates, residual density of reserve rates is given
by fV (r) = f(r). For interest rates r ≥ rV ,
q¯V (r) =
xV
∫ q1
r
qf(q)dq
xV (1− F (r)) =
∫ q1
r
qf(q)dq
1− F (r) = q¯(r) (13)
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because for these interest rates, fV (r) = xV f(r). Thus, a variable rate tender as
described in Lemma 4 has no effect on the average reserve rate. From this it follows
that g(q¯V (r)) = g(q¯(r)) for all r ≤ q1.
Condition 3 requires that JHV (t) = JH(t) for all t. This condition is satisfied by
assumption. From the discussion of the residual average reserve rate it follows that
residual supply equals supply, i.e., SV (r) = J ·H(r/g(q¯V (r))) = J ·H(r/g(q¯(r))) =
S(r) for all r ≥ q0. Since all conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, rV ≤ r∗.
We now prove that rV < r∗. From (10) follows that DV (rV ) = D(rV )− k. Because
SV (r) = S(r) for all r ≥ q0, k = D(rV )− S(rV ) such that D(rV ) > S(rV ). Because
D(r)− S(r) is strictly decreasing in r by Lemma 1, r∗ > rV . 
Intuitively, a variable rate tender lowers the equilibrium interbank market rate be-
cause this form of intervention lowers demand for interbank credit at high interest
rates. However, similar to a fixed rate tender, a variable rate tender has no effect
on supply of interbank credits. This is because it leaves the distribution of borrower
types in the market and therefore, the interest rate default cost ratio r/g(q¯(r)),
unaffected. Theorem 3 describes the simultaneous equilibrium with a variable rate
tender where the tender equilibrium is best response to the interbank equilibrium
and vice versa.
Figure IV illustrates the interbank market with and without a variable rate tender
as described in Lemma 4.
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Figure IV: Variable rate tender: impact on interbank market rate
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The interbank market without intervention in Figure IV is characterized by the
same parameter vector as the interbank market in Figure I. Moreover, the central
bank offers the same amount of credits as with a fixed rate tender, i.e., k = 0.3.
For interest rates r ≥ rV , residual demand is proportional to demand because k
randomly chosen borrowers with q ≥ rV receive a central bank credit and drop out
of the interbank market. Since there is a drop in demand at higher interest rates
and supply remains the same, rV < r∗ with D(rV ) − k = S(rV ). In the example,
the equilibrium interbank rate drops from r∗ = 1.79 to rV = 1.52.
Theorem 4. Any tender equilibrium described in Theorem 2 leads to the same
interbank equilibrium rV as the tender equilibrium described in Lemma 4.
Proof. Any equilibrium in Theorem 2 leads to a selection of successful bidders
which is a random selection of borrowers with q ≥ rV . As shown in the proof
of Theorem 2, borrowers with q ≥ rV choose their bid randomly and at least k
borrowers bid bq ≥ k in the equilibrium. Moreover, borrowers with q < rV choose
randomly among bids bq < r
V . Thus, the ordering of the bids bq ≥ rV = rT is a
random order of borrowers with q ≥ rV . This is also the case if, by coincidence, all
or some bidders with q ≥ rV submit the same bid. Therefore, the successful bidders
are always a random selection of borrowers with q ≥ rV .
It follows that for any equilibrium in Theorem 2, residual demand in the interbank
market with a variable rate is given by (10). To see why, consider the following.
If the group of successful bidders is a random selection of borrowers with q ≥
rV , the probability that a successful bidder has a reserve rate q ≥ r is given by(
k/D(rV )
)
(1− F (r)). Thus, the probability that there are borrowers with q ≥ r
in the interbank market equals (1− F (r))xV for interest rates r ≥ rV , where xV =
1 − k/D(rV ). For interbank rates r < rV , borrowers prefer interbank over central
bank credits. Hence, residual demand is indeed given by (10).
For any equilibrium in Theorem 2, residual supply in the interbank market with a
variable rate tender equals supply in the interbank market without any intervention.
This follows from the proof of Theorem 3. In this proof we show that given residual
demand (10), q¯V (r) = q¯(r) for all interbank rates r ≤ q1 such that SV (r) = S(r).
Since residual demand for any equilibrium in Theorem 2 is given by (10), residual
supply indeed equals supply in the interbank market without intervention.
It follows that any equilibrium in Theorem 2 leads to the same residual demand
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and supply function as the equilibrium in Lemma 4. This in turn implies that any
equilibrium in Theorem 2 leads to the same level of rV as the equilibrium in Lemma
4. 
4.3 Comparison: Effect on the equilibrium interbank rate
In this section we compare the effect of the two tenders described in Section 4.1 and
Section 4.2 on the interbank rate. We assume that k is the same for both tenders.
Theorem 5. If rI is such that k = D(rI) − S(rI), rF = rV . If rI is such that
k < D(rI)− S(rI), rF > rV .
Proof. If rI is such that k = D(rI)−S(rI), DF (rI) = D(rI)−k = S(rI) = SF (rI),
where the last equality follows from the proof of Theorem 1. Thus, rI = rF = rV ,
where the latter equality comes from the fact that at r = rV , DV (r) = D(r) − k.
However, if k < D(rI) − S(rI), DF (rI) = D(rI) − k > S(rI) and rF > rI . Thus,
by Lemma 1, rV > rI because at rV , DV (rV ) = D(rV )− k = S(rV ) = SV (rV ). For
interest rates r > rI , DF (r) = D(r)·x = D(r)−D(r)/D(rI)·k, where D(r)/D(rI) <
1 for r > rI . Therefore, at rV , DV (rV ) = D(rV ) − k = S(rV ), whereas DF (rV ) =
D(rV )−D(rV )/D(rI) · k > D(rV )− k = S(rV ). Thus, by Lemma 1, rF > rV . 
Thus, while injecting the same amount of liquidity, the variable rate tender lowers
the equilibrium interbank market rate by more than a fixed rate tender if rI is low.
The intuition is simple. If rI < rV , the fixed rate tender also serves borrowers with
lower reserve rates, i.e., those with rI ≤ q ≤ rV . These borrowers do not get a
central bank credit in the variable rate tender. Thus, with a fixed rate tender, less
borrowers with q ≥ rV drop out of the market than with a variable rate tender such
that at higher interest rates, demand for interbank credits is larger with a fixed than
with a variable rate tender. As a result, the interbank market rate may be lower
with a variable than with a fixed rate tender, as illustrated in Figure V.
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Figure V: Comparison of fixed and variable rate tender
We now briefly discuss the distance between rF and rV and its dependence on the
primitives of the model. Assume rI to be such that k < D(rI) − S(rI) and thus,
rV < rF by Theorem 5. By Definition 4, DV (rV ) − S(rV ) = 0, i.e., excess residual
demand with a variable rate tender equals zero at interest rate rV . However, from
the proof of Theorem 5 we know that DF (rV ) − S(rV ) > 0, i.e., residual excess
demand with a fixed rate tender is positive at rV . For interest rates r > rV ,
excess residual demand DF (r) − S(r) goes to zero as the interest rate increases
(Lemma 1). By Definition 2, it eventually reaches zero at interest rate r = rF ,
where DF (rF )−S(rF ) = 0. Hence, the distance between rF and rV depends on the
size of residual excess demand at r = rV and its decline at interest rates r ≥ rV . The
smaller the residual excess demand at rV and the larger its derivative with respect
to r for interest rates r ≥ rV , the closer is rF to rV . Residual excess demand at
r = rV is given by
DF (rV )− S(rV ) = D(rV )
(
1− k
D(rI)
)
− S(rV ). (14)
Residual excess demand at rV is small if rI is high and close to rV . Then, D(rI)
and therefore, DF (rV ) = D(rV )(1 − k/D(rI)) is small. The derivative of residual
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excess demand reads
∂
∂r
(DF (r)− S(r)) = ∂D(r)
∂r
(
1− k
D(rI)
)
− ∂S(r)
∂r
= −f(r)W
(
1− k
D(rI)
)
− J · h
(
r
g(q¯(r))
)
∂
∂r
r
g(q¯(r))
(15)
for interest rates r ≥ rV . It is large for interest rates r ≥ rV if the elasticity of
demand is large, the elasticity of relative riskiness is small, and the elasticity of the
willingness to lend is sufficiently large. To see why, consider the following. If the
elasticity of demand, i.e., |εD| = f(r)r/(1 − F (r)), is large at r, f(r) and the first
term in (15) are large as well. However,
∂
∂r
r
g(q¯(r))
=
1
g(q¯(r))
(
q¯(r)− εg ∂q¯(r)
∂r
r
)
. (16)
If the elasticity of demand is large, q¯(r) and g(q¯(r)) are low whereas ∂q¯(r)/∂r is
high such that, ceteris paribus, (16) can be either large or small. If the elasticity of
relative riskiness, εg, is small, it is more likely that (16) is large. This, however, is
not sufficient for the second term in (15) to be large. To make sure that this term is
large, the elasticity of the willingness to lend, i.e., h(t)t/H(t) has to be sufficiently
large for t = r/g(q¯(r)) such that h(r/g(q¯(r))) is sufficiently large at r. To sum
up, if the fixed rate tender is such that rF > rV , rF is close to rV if rI is close to
rV , and for interest rates r ≥ rV , the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of the
willingness to lend are large, and the elasticity of relative riskiness is small.
Even though the variable rate tender may lower the interbank market rate by more
than a fixed rate tender, the fixed rate tender is the more flexible reverse open market
operation than the variable rate tender. This is because with a variable rate tender,
the resulting equilibrium interbank rate is determined solely by k. However, with a
fixed rate tender, the resulting equilibrium interbank rate is determined both by k
and rI . Hence, the fixed rate tender not only allows to implement the equilibrium
in a market with a variable rate tender. The possibility to set the interest rate for
central bank credits also allows some fine-tuning of the interbank rate which is not
possible with the variable rate tender.
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5 Social welfare
In this section we turn to the question how fixed and variable rate tenders affect
social welfare. The answer to this question is not obvious at first sight because a
decrease in the interbank market rate has two opposing effects on social welfare. On
the one hand, borrowers’ welfare increases because they have to pay less for a credit.
On the other hand, lenders’ welfare decreases because they face a lower ratio of the
interest rate to the riskiness of a loan. Moreover, the implementation of a lower
equilibrium interbank rate through reverse open market operations may be costly.
In the following analysis, we will study the sign and size of the aggregate of these
effects.
Definition 7. Equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market without any
intervention is given by
U = UB + UL =
∫ q1
r∗
D(r)dr +
∫ r∗
r0
S(r)dr, (17)
where UB is the aggregate borrower welfare, UL denotes the aggregate lender welfare,
and r0 is such that r0/g(q¯(r0)) = t0.
The equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market without any intervention is
the sum of borrower and lender rents. In the interbank equilibrium, a borrower with
reserve rate q ≥ r∗ receives an interbank credit at rate r∗ such that her individual
rent equals q − r∗. Thus, the aggregate equilibrium welfare of borrowers reads
UB = W
∫ q1
r∗
(q − r∗)f(q)dq = W
∫ q1
r∗
(1− F (q)) dq, (18)
which is nothing else but
∫ q1
r∗ D(r)dr.
13 A lender with hedging type t ≤ r∗/g(q¯(r∗))
lends her funds in the interbank market at rate r∗. This lender is willing to ac-
cept the ratio of the interest rate to the riskiness rt/g(q¯(rt)), where rt is such that
rt − tg(q¯(rt)) = 0. However, the lender gets r∗/g(q¯(r∗)). Thus, her rent equals
r∗/g(q¯(r∗))− t. Using a different measuring scale, lender t’s rent can be written as
13For the second equality in (18) see Van den Berg (1994), for example.
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r∗ − rt. The aggregate equilibrium welfare of lenders is therefore given by
UL = J
∫ r∗/g(q¯(r∗))
t0
(
r∗
g(q¯(r∗))
− t
)
h(t)dt = J
∫ r∗/g(q¯(r∗))
t0
H(t)dt, (19)
which can be rewritten as
∫ r∗
r0
S(r)dr. For illustration, see the left-hand side of
Figure VI below.
5.1 Effect of the fixed rate tender on social welfare
Assume that the central bank uses a fixed rate tender to inject liquidity, and this
fixed rate tender is characterized by (rI , k), where rI < r∗ and k < D(rI) − S(rI).
From Theorem 1 follows that rF < r∗.
We assume that the social welfare in an interbank market with a fixed rate tender
not only consists of the aggregate borrower and lender rents, but also of the central
bank’s returns and costs of lending k credits. If a borrower defaults on a central
bank credit, the central bank has no direct default costs. This is because in principle,
the central bank can replace any loss by simply printing money. However, printing
money is costly because it may raise the inflation rate. Thus, the central bank’s
expected costs of default are the expected costs of a higher inflation rate. The
central bank’s expected profit from a loan at interest rate r is therefore assumed to
be given by
pic(r; tc) = p(r)r − tc(1− p(r)), (20)
where tc are the costs of a higher inflation rate. If tc is small, printing money is
cheap because either a higher inflation rate is not very costly or printing money
leads to a small increase in the inflation rate. We assume tc to be low enough for
the central bank’s expected profit from a loan to be positive at interest rate rI , i.e.,
p(rI)rI − tc(1− p(rI)) > 0.
Definition 8. Equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market with a fixed rate
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tender is given by
UF = UFB + U
F
L + U
F
C
= x
∫ q1
rF
D(r)dr + (1− x)
∫ q1
rI
D(r)dr +
∫ rF
r0
S(r)dr + k
(
rI − tcg(q¯(rI))
)
,
(21)
where UFC is the central bank’s welfare from a fixed rate tender.
With a fixed rate tender, the fraction x of borrowers with q ≥ rF gets an interbank
credit at interest rate rF and has an individual rent of q− rF . The fraction 1− x of
borrowers with q ≥ rI gets a central bank credit and pays the interest rate rI . The
individual rent of these borrowers is given by q − rI . Lenders with t ≤ rF/g(q¯(rF ))
lend their funds at the ratio of the interest rate to the riskiness rF/g(q¯(rF )) such
that their individual rent reads rF − rt. Moreover, the central bank lends k credits
to randomly chosen borrowers with q ≥ rI at the interest rate rI . The aggregate
welfare of borrowers and lenders in an interbank market with a fixed rate tender is
illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure VI.
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Figure VI: Social welfare in the interbank market without and with a fixed rate
tender
Theorem 6. Assume k ≤ D(rI) − S(rI) and rI < r∗ such that rF < r∗. Then,
UF > U .
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Proof. For the proof of Theorem 6, see Appendix A4.
Intuitively, the fixed rate tender increases social welfare because it increases the
borrowers’ aggregate welfare by more than it decreases the lenders’ aggregate wel-
fare. Moreover, by assumption, the expected costs of higher inflation are lower than
the expected returns from central bank lending. Consider the effect of a fixed rate
tender on the rents of those borrowers and lenders who are in the market at r∗.
With a fixed rate tender, the borrowers with q ≥ r∗ remain in the market at rF
and gain at least r∗ − rF . Thus, the aggregate gain in the rents of these borrowers
equals at least D(r∗)(r∗− rF ). From the lenders which are in the market at r∗, only
those with t ≤ rF/g(q¯(rF )) remain in the market. These lenders lose r∗ − rF . The
lenders with t ∈ [rF/g(q¯(rF )), r∗/g(q¯(r∗))] drop out of the market. However, their
loss equals r∗ − rt, where rt ∈ [rF , r∗]. Thus, the drop in the lenders’ aggregate
welfare is lower than S(r∗)(r∗ − rF ) = D(r∗)(r∗ − rF ). From this it follows that
the rise in borrower’s aggregate welfare indeed overcompensates the drop in lenders’
aggregate welfare. Thereby, the gain of those borrowers which enter the market
because of a lower interest rate and the gain of those borrowers which only have to
pay rI < rF has not even been taken into account yet.
5.2 Effect of the variable rate tender on social welfare
Assume now that the central bank uses a variable rate tender to lend k central bank
credits to banks. Suppose that the equilibrium in the variable rate tender is as
described in Lemma 4 and rT = rV . From Theorem 3 it follows that rV < r∗.
Definition 9. Equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market with a variable
rate tender is given by
UV = UVB + U
V
L + U
V
C
=
∫ q1
rV
D(r)dr +
∫ rV
r0
S(r)dr + k
(
rV − tcg(q¯(rV ))
)
, (22)
where UVC is the central bank’s welfare from a variable rate tender.
We assume tc to be low enough for the central bank’s profit on a loan to be positive,
i.e., rV − tcg(q¯(rV )) > 0.
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Theorem 7. Assume k < D(rV ) and the tender equilibrium to be as described in
Lemma 4 such that rV < r∗. Then, UV > U .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 7 can be found in Appendix A5.
The effect of a variable rate tender on social welfare is similar to the effect of a
fixed rate tender. A variable rate tender increases social welfare because it increases
the borrowers’ aggregate welfare by more than it decreases the lenders’ aggregate
welfare. Moreover, by assumption, the expected costs of higher inflation are lower
than the expected returns from central bank lending. The reason why the borrowers’
aggregate welfare increases by more than the lenders’ aggregate welfare decreases
is as follows. All borrowers which are in the market without intervention gain
r∗ − rV with the variable rate tender. All lenders which are in the market without
intervention lose r∗− rV or drop out of the market and lose r∗− rt < r∗− rV . Since,
without intervention, the mass of borrowers equals the mass of lenders at r∗, the
gain in the borrowers’ aggregate welfare overcompensates the loss in the lenders’
aggregate welfare. The aggregate welfare of borrowers and lenders in an interbank
market with a variable rate tender is illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure
VII.
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Figure VII: Social welfare in the interbank market without and with a variable
rate tender
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5.3 Comparison
As we have seen above, both forms of reverse open market operations increase social
welfare. If rI is such that k = D(rI) − S(rI), rI = rF = rV and the increase in
social welfare is the same for both tenders. However, assume that rI is chosen such
that k < D(rI)− S(rI), i.e., rI < rV . Then, according to Theorem 5, rV < rF . So,
the fixed rate tender’s effect on social welfare may differ from the effect of a variable
rate tender. In this section, we examine exactly this point.
Theorem 8. Assume rV < rF . Then, UFB + U
F
L > U
V
B + U
V
L , whereas U
F
C < U
V
C .
Proof. For the proof of Theorem 8, see Appendix A6.
Hence, a fixed rate tender increases the aggregate welfare of borrowers and lenders
by more than a variable rate tender. With a fixed rate tender, some of the borrowers
only have to pay rI < rV such that there is an additional gain in the borrowers’
aggregate welfare which is not generated by a variable rate tender. This overcom-
pensates the lower increase in the sum of borrowers’ and lenders’ aggregate welfare
caused by the smaller drop in the interbank rate. However, because rI < rT = rV ,
the central bank faces a lower ratio of the interest rate to the riskiness if it uses a
fixed rate tender. Hence, for the central bank, the fixed rate tender is less attractive
than the variable rate tender. The relative attractiveness of a fixed rate tender is
even lower for low values of rI . Whether social welfare with a fixed rate tender ex-
ceeds social welfare with a variable rate tender ultimately depends on the parameter
values.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss empirical evidence for our results on the variable rate
tender and perform some robustness checks.
6.1 Empirical evidence
The comparison of our results on variable rate tenders with empirical studies not
only delivers empirical evidence in favor of our findings. It also supports Ayuso
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and Repullo’s (2003) finding that the bidding behavior of banks is similar in dis-
criminatory (pay what you bid) and uniform-rate auctions. In their comprehensive
study, Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) present a model of bidding in variable
rate tenders. In this model, banks with individual liquidity needs can get central
bank credits against collateral. They submit a set of interest rate-quantity pairs
and pay the submitted interest rates if they are successful with some of their bids.
Moreover, secured interbank credits may require collateral of higher quality than
secured central bank credits. To show that bids depend both on the willingness to
pay for a central bank credit and the strategic response to bids of other banks, Cas-
sola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) use data on repo auctions of the European Central
Bank.14 For the variable rate tenders before August 9, 2007 (start of the recent fi-
nancial crisis), they find the following. Bidders have a good idea of the interest rate
at which the variable rate tender will clear. Thereby, Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl
(2011) use the average number of interest rate-quantity pairs in a bid as a measure
of the bidder’s uncertainty about the clearing rate, where a low average number in-
dicates low uncertainty. This corresponds to our assumption that bidders anticipate
rT . Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) find evidence for bid shading, i.e., bids
do not correspond with the bidders’ individual valuation for a central bank credit.
This is in line with our finding that banks do not necessarily bid their reserve rate.
In the variable rate tender of the European Central Bank, bids are concentrated on
the repo rate, i.e., the interbank rate. This finding corresponds to the equilibrium
bidding behavior of borrowers with q ≥ rV described in Lemma 4. Both before
and after August 2007, the variable rate tenders of the European Central Bank are
efficient in the sense that banks with the highest marginal values for central bank
credits are awarded the liquidity. This supports our finding that only borrowers with
q ≥ rV may be served with a central bank credit. Moreover, Cassola, Hortac¸su, and
Kastl (2011) find that before August 2007, the bidders’ valuation for central bank
credits is weakly higher than the interbank rate. In our set-up, this would require
that, instead of submitting bq < r
V and being unsuccessful with probability one,
borrowers with q < rV do not participate in the variable rate tender. Imposing this
14In particular, they use data on all submitted bids in 50 discriminatory repo auctions of liquidity
provided via collateralized loans with 1-week maturity conducted as part of the regular main
refinancing operations of the European Central Bank between January 4, 2007 and December 11,
2007.
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assumption, however, would not change our results.
6.2 Robustness
In this section we consider some of the assumptions made in Sections 3 and 4 and
briefly discuss how changes in these assumptions influence the effect of liquidity in-
jections on the equilibrium interbank rate.
An important assumption is that pX(p) decreases with p, i.e., the higher the proba-
bility of success, the lower the expected project return. This assumption is required
for adverse selection to emerge. Assume that pX(p) strongly increases with p. This
could cause the reserve rate q to increase with p such that borrowers with low prob-
ability of default drop out of the interbank market at higher interest rates than
borrowers with high probability of default. But then, instead of adverse selection,
the interbank market is characterized by favorable selection where an interest rate
attracts those borrowers with relatively low default probability. This kind of selec-
tion, however, does not seem to apply to interbank markets.
One could also imagine that either L or I or both differ across borrowers. For exam-
ple, let L decrease with q such that the borrower’s demand for credit increases with
the probability of default. This causes adverse selection to worsen because at any
interest rate, the proportion of demand stemming from borrowers with high default
probability increases. In contrast, if L increases with q, the borrower’s demand for
credit decreases with the probability of default. As a result, adverse selection miti-
gates.15 However, such changes in the set-up do not prevent fixed and variable rate
tenders from lowering the interbank rate.
It is very interesting to consider changes in the assumption that in case of project
failure, the borrowers’ repayment to the lender equals zero. Assume that if the
project fails, the repayment to the lender is positive. Moreover, assume that bor-
rowers with high default probability repay much less in case of project failure than
borrowers with low default probability. The lenders’ expected return on a loan may
now be such that they prefer lower over high interest rates. For example, supply
could be backward bending, i.e., supply increases at low interest rates and decreases
at high interest rates. This may not only lead to multiple market-clearing equilibria,
15Note that if L is a random draw and independent of q or if L and I simultaneously differ
across borrowers, additional assumptions on the combination of L, q, and I are required for adverse
selection to sustain.
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but it may also change the effect of central bank tenders on the interbank rate signif-
icantly. Fixed and variable rate tenders still decrease demand for interbank credits
at high interest rates. However, because supply is backward bending, this may now
lead to an increase in the equilibrium interbank rate. Thus, the effect of reverse
open market operations may be reversed and instead of lowering the interbank rate,
these operations may raise the interbank rate.
In our set-up, we assume that the central bank only partially replaces the interbank
market, i.e., k < D(rI) and k < D(rV ), respectively. Consider first the fixed rate
tender and assume that k ≥ D(rI). If all borrowers who apply for a central bank
credit receive one, demand in the interbank market is zero for r ≥ rI and positive
and strictly higher than supply for r < rI . But then, there is no market-clearing
equilibrium in the interbank market and the analysis of the effect of a fixed rate
tender on the equilibrium interbank rate is no longer feasible. Consider now the
variable rate tender and assume k ≥ D(rV ). This implies DV (rV ) = S(rV ) = 0
such that there is no trade in the interbank market equilibrium with a variable rate
tender. But then, the effect of the variable rate tender on the interbank rate is no
longer defined. Moreover, the fact that no interbank credits are traded in equilib-
rium affects the borrowers’ bidding behavior in the variable rate tender. Now, all
borrowers willing to pay rV want to be successful bidders.
One could also assume that, instead of randomly choosing k borrowers and serving
each with a central bank credit, the central bank allocates the k units pro rata,
according to the ratio of k to the demand for central bank credits.16 In a fixed rate
tender, the fraction of a central bank credit each participating borrower gets then
coincides with the probability to get a central bank credit if the central bank chooses
randomly. This in turn implies that with pro rata allotment, residual demand and
the effect of the fixed rate tender on the interbank market are the same as with
random selection. In a variable rate tender, the central bank may decide that in
case there are several bids equal to the kth highest bid, it does not choose randomly
among the borrowers with these bids to allocate the remaining credits. Instead, the
central bank may decide to allocate the remaining units pro rata, according to the
ratio of the remaining units to the number of bidders submitting the kth highest
16Such an allotment procedure is used, for example, by the European Central Bank in fixed
rate tenders, if the aggregate amount of bids exceeds the total amount of liquidity the European
Central Bank wants to allot (cf., European Central Bank, 2010).
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bid. Consider the equilibrium in Lemma 4, where all borrowers with q ≥ rV submit
bq = r
V . Again, the fraction of a central bank credit each successful bidder gets
then coincides with the probability to get a central bank credit if the central bank
chooses randomly. Hence, with pro rata allotment, residual demand and the effect
of a variable rate tender on the interbank market are the same as with random
selection.
For the variable rate tender we assume that all successful bidders have to pay rT .
In discriminatory auctions used by the European Central Bank, for example, suc-
cessful bidders pay their individual bid. As already discussed at the beginning of
this section, the introduction of a discriminatory procedure should not change our
results for the equilibrium in the variable rate tender.
7 Concluding remarks
This study has dealt with the effect of fixed and variable rate tenders on the unique
equilibrium interbank market rate and social welfare.
It suggests that with asymmetric information on the default probability, both fixed
and variable rate tenders decrease the interbank rate. Moreover, a central bank’s
liquidity injection through a variable rate tender may lead to a lower interbank
rate than an injection of the same amount of liquidity through a fixed rate tender.
However, a fixed rate tender allows to fine-tune the interbank rate. Moreover, both
tenders increase social welfare. Thereby, the increase in the central bank’s welfare
is higher with a variable rate tender, whereas the increase in aggregate welfare of
borrowers and lenders is higher with a fixed rate tender.
Our results propose that, besides historical practice and doctrine, the central bank’s
choice of the type of reverse open market operations should account for the possi-
bility of asymmetric information on the probability of default.
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Appendix
Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Assume ∂|εD|/∂r ≥ 0 and εg ≤ 1 for r ≥ q0. Then, ∂S(r)/∂r ≥ 0, and the
market-clearing equilibrium is unique.
Proof. For a single market-clearing equilibrium it suffices that demand and supply in-
tersect at most once. By definition, demand equals W for r ≤ q0, it is strictly decreasing
for q0 < r ≤ q1, and it is zero for interest rates r ≥ q1. The average reserve rate is con-
stant for interest rates r ≤ q0 and strictly increasing on the interest rate interval [q0, q1].
Moreover, the average reserve rate is not defined for interest rates r > q1 and by assump-
tion, q¯(q1) = q1. Thus, supply is strictly increasing for interest rates r ≤ q0 and because
of r − t0g(q¯(r)) > 0 at r = q1, supply is positive at r = q1. Supply is not defined for
r > q1 such that it cannot cross demand at these interest rates. Hence, for at most one
market-clearing equilibrium, it suffices that supply is weakly increasing for interest rates
r ∈ [q0, q1]. From its definition it follows that supply is weakly increasing if the ratio of
the interest rate to the riskiness r/g(q¯(r)) is weakly increasing for r ∈ [q0, q1], i.e.,
∂
∂r
r
g(q¯(r))
≥ 0
⇔ q¯(r) ≥ r∂g(q¯(r))
∂q¯
q¯(r)
g(q¯(r))
∂q¯(r)
∂r
⇔ 1
εg
≥ ∂q¯(r)
∂r
r
q¯(r)
. (A.1)
Van den Berg (1994) shows that ∂|εD|/∂r ≥ 0 suffices for
∂ log q¯(r)
∂ log r
=
∂q¯(r)
∂r
r
q¯(r)
≤ 1 (A.2)
to be satisfied. Then, the combination of εg ≤ 1 and ∂|εD|/∂r ≥ 0 suffices for (A.1) to be
satisfied and the ratio of the interest rate to the riskiness to be weakly increasing. Note
that because q¯(r) is increasing in r, εg has to be positive. This confirms that g(q¯(r)) is
strictly increasing in q¯(r). It follows that under a non-decreasing elasticity of demand and
a low elasticity of the relative riskiness of a loan, supply S(r) is weakly increasing and
positive on the interval [q0, q1] and strictly increasing for interest rates r < q0. Hence,
D(r)−S(r) is strictly decreasing or negative for all for all r ≥ q0 and there is at most one
market-clearing equilibrium. 
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Appendix A2: Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Assume
∣∣∣εDB (r)∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣εDA(r)∣∣∣ for all r < q1. Then q¯B(r) ≤ q¯A(r) for all r < q1.
Proof. Let the distribution of reserve rates change from FA to FB such that εD
B
(r) ≤
εD
A
(r) for all r < q1, i.e.
∂ log(1− FB(r))
∂ log r
≤ ∂ log(1− F
A(r))
∂ log r
. (A.3)
Since both sides are negative, this is nothing else but
∣∣∣εDA(r)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣εDB (r)∣∣∣. Because
∂ log r = (1/r)∂r, (A.3) can be rewritten as
−∂ log(1− F
A(r))
∂r
≤ −∂ log(1− F
B(r))
∂r
. (A.4)
Integrating (A.4) over the interval [r′, r] for q0 < r′ < r yields
log(1− FA(r))− log(1− FA(r′)) ≤ log(1− FB(r))− log(1− FB(r′)). (A.5)
Applying the negative exponential function to both sides of inequality (A.5), we obtain
1− FB(r′)
1− FB(r) ≤
1− FA(r′)
1− FA(r) . (A.6)
By another integration, one finds
1
1− FB(r)
∫ q1
r
(1− FB(q))dq ≤ 1
1− FA(r)
∫ q1
r
(1− FA(q))dq. (A.7)
Partial integration yields
1
1− FB(r)
∫ q1
r
qfB(q)dq ≤ 1
1− FA(r)
∫ q1
r
qfA(q)dq, (A.8)
which is just q¯B(r) ≤ q¯A(r). 
Appendix A3: Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Assume that
1) WB
(
1− FB(r)) ≤WA (1− FA(r)) for all r ≤ q1,
2) fB(r)/(1− FB(r)) ≥ fA(r)/(1− FA(r)) for all r < q1
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3) JBHB(t) ≥ JAHA(t) for all t.
Then, rB ≤ rA, where ri denotes the respective interest rate in the unique market-clearing
equilibrium in interbank market M i = MA,MB.
Proof. We prove Proposition 1 by contradiction. Assume rB > rA. Then, from condition
1 in Proposition 1 it follows that DB(rB) ≤ DB(rA) ≤ DA(rA). On the other hand,
SB(rB) ≥ SB(rA) ≥ SA(rA). The first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact
that the elasticity of demand is non-decreasing and the elasticity of relative riskiness
is low in both markets. For the second inequality, consider the following. Because of
condition 3, it suffices to show that r/g(q¯B(r)) ≥ r/g(q¯A(r)) for r = rA. By Lemma 2,
condition 2 is sufficient for this inequality to be satisfied. Because DB(rB) = SB(rB) and
DA(rA) = SA(rA), DB(rB) ≤ DB(rA) ≤ DA(rA) = SA(rA) ≤ SB(rA) ≤ SB(rB). But
then, necessarily, all the weak inequalities must be equalities. In particular, SB(rA) =
SB(rB) = DB(rB) = DB(rA). From the uniqueness of the market-clearing equilibrium
follows that rB = rA, which is the required contradiction. 
Appendix A4: Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. Assume k ≤ D(rI)− S(rI) and rI < r∗ such that rF < r∗. Then, UF > U .
Proof. The difference between the equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market
with a fixed rate tender and without any intervention is given by the difference between
(21) and (17), i.e.,
x
∫ r∗
rF
D(r)dr + (1− x)
∫ r∗
rI
D(r)dr −
∫ r∗
rF
S(r)dr + k
(
rI − tcg(q¯(rI))
)
. (A.9)
To prove Theorem 6, it remains to show that (A.9) is positive. Rewriting the first and the
second term in (A.9) yields
∫ r∗
rF
D(r)dr + (1− x)
∫ rF
rI
D(r)dr. (A.10)
By Definition 1, D(r∗) = S(r∗) and by Lemma 1, D(r) > S(r) for r < r∗. Therefore,∫ r∗
rF D(r)dr >
∫ r∗
rF S(r)dr. Moreover, by assumption, r
I − tcg(q¯(rI)) > 0. Thus, (A.9) is
indeed positive. From this it follows that UF > U , i.e., the equilibrium social welfare with
a fixed rate tender is higher than the equilibrium social welfare without any intervention.

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Appendix A5: Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. Assume k < D(rV ) and the tender equilibrium to be as described in Lemma
4 such that rV < r∗. Then, UV > U .
Proof. The difference between the equilibrium social welfare in the interbank market with
a variable rate tender and without any intervention is given by the difference between (22)
and (17), i.e., ∫ r∗
rV
D(r)dr −
∫ r∗
rV
S(r)dr + k
(
rV − tcg(q¯(rV ))
)
. (A.11)
To prove Theorem 7, it remains to show that (A.11) is positive. Given Lemma 1, D(r∗) =
S(r∗) and D(r) > S(r) for r < r∗ such that
∫ r∗
rV D(r)dr >
∫ r∗
rV S(r)dr. Moreover, by
assumption, rV − tcg(q¯(rV )) is positive. Thus, (A.11) is indeed positive. From this it
follows that UV > U , i.e., the equilibrium social welfare with a variable rate tender is
higher than the equilibrium social welfare without any intervention. 
Appendix A6: Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. Assume rV < rF . Then, UFB + U
F
L > U
V
B + U
V
L , whereas U
F
C < U
V
C .
Proof. The difference between UF and UV is given by
(UFB + U
F
L )− (UVB + UVL ) + (UFC − UVC ) (A.12)
= (1− x)
∫ rF
rI
D(r)dr +
∫ rF
rV
(S(r)−D(r)) dr
+ k
[
rI − rV − tc
(
g(q¯(rI))− g(q¯(rV )))] .
Note that S(r) − D(r) < 0 for r ∈ [rV , rF ] and recall that rI < rV . At interest rate
rI , (1 − x)D(rI) = k. Moreover, at interest rate rV , D(rV ) − S(rV ) = k. For (1 −
x)
∫ rF
rI D(r)dr >
∣∣∣∫ rFrV (S(r)−D(r)) dr∣∣∣, i.e., (UFB +UFL ) > (UVB +UVL ), it therefore suffices
that in the interval (rV , rF ), D(r)−S(r) decreases by more than (1−x)D(r) as r increases,
i.e.,
∂
∂r
(1− x)D(r) > ∂
∂r
(D(r)− S(r)) . (A.13)
The left-hand side of (A.13) is given by −k/D(rI) ·Wf(r). The right-hand side of (A.13)
is given by
−Wf(r)− Jh
(
r
g(q¯(r))
)
∂
∂r
r
g(q¯(r))
. (A.14)
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Because ∂/∂r(r/g(q¯(r))) > 0, this derivative is negative. Moreover, because k/D(rI) < 1,
−k/D(rI) ·Wf(r) > −Wf(r) and the left-hand side of (A.13) is indeed larger than the
right-hand side of (A.13). From this it follows that indeed, (UFB + U
F
L ) > (U
V
B + U
V
L ).
From Lemma 1 we know that rI/g(q¯(rI)) < rV /g(q¯(rV )) and from rI < rV follows
g(q¯(rI)) < g(q¯(rV )) such that rI − tcg(q¯(rI)) < rV − tcg(q¯(rV )). From this it follows
that UFC < U
V
C . 
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